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INTRODUCTION

Codes of professional responsibility take a very different approach
to civil and criminal trials. In civil litigation, the codes presume that
good outcomes result when lawyers represent clients aggressively.1 In
criminal cases, the codes do not rely as fully on competitive lawyering.
They treat prosecutors as advocates, but also as "ministers" having an
ethical duty to "do justice."2
Although the special prosecutorial duty is worded so vaguely that it
obviously requires further explanation, the codes provide remarkably
little guidance on its meaning.3 In effect, code drafters have delegated
to prosecutors the task of resolving the special ethical issues prosecutors face at every stage of trial.4 Is a prosecutor free to seek a jury biased against the defendant? If a prosecutor becomes convinced at trial
that defense counsel is overmatched because of limited resources, what
1. Aggressive representation, however, is subject to the codes' limited constraints on excessive lawyer conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (providing limits on specific types of aggressive advocacy); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981) [hereinafter CODE] (noting that "[tihe duty of a lawyer ... is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations") (footnotes omitted).
2. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8 comment (1) (stating that government lawyers
are "minister[s] of justice"); CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-13 (providing that government lawyers must
"seek justice"); see also ABA Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958) [hereinafter ABA Joint
Conference] (noting prosecutor's "dual role"); Defoor, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L.J. 443, 448 (1983) (citing prosecutor's "semi-judicial position" under Florida law);
cf. Note, Role of the Prosecutor: Fair Minister of Justice with Firm Convictions, 16 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REv. 295, 297 (1982) (discussing Canadian prosecutor's minister of justice role).
Throughout this Article, I refer to "the codes" as a shorthand for the many state professional rules
that model themselves after the two ABA codes. See supra note 1. Virtually all states have
adopted the general approach of one of the model codes and have accepted the "do justice" standard for government lawyers.
3. The duty to "do justice" applies to all government attorneys, but takes on its most dramatic significance in criminal prosecutions. This Article's discussion is confined to the criminal
context.
4. Richard Danzig points out that it is not unusual for code drafters to write general ethical
proscriptions and leave it to others to define them. See Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 628-29 (1975). Thus, for example, the
Uniform Commercial Code proscribes "unconscionable" contracts, assuming that someone (e.g.,
courts and tradesmen) will give meaning to unconscionability. Danzig dubiously notes that the
premise of such rules is "that values have an objectively ascertainable existence and a near universal acceptance and thus can be judicially discovered." Id. at 629. As this Article discusses, the
professional codes' requirement that prosecutors "do justice" has no universally accepted meaning
and does not lend itself to easy interpretation.
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are the prosecutor's options? Should she5 help a defendant whose lawyer is incompetent? What should she do if she believes the judge incorrectly has restricted counsel's ability to present a defense? In her own
presentation, may she legitimately invite the jurors to draw false inferences from the facts? How emotional a summation may she make in her

effort to sway the jury toward conviction?
The interpretive literature is no more helpful than the codes in
resolving these and other ethical trial issues raised by the "do justice"
admonition. Scholars have focused exclusively on constitutional requirements and on issues relating to prosecutorial policy at the pretrial
and sentencing stages. Moreover, judges seem intent on limiting their
own role in defining appropriate trial conduct by prosecutors. Courts
have declined to strengthen legal and constitutional controls, based in
part on the belief that independent professional regulation best constrains prosecutorial behavior.7
5. To avoid confusion, throughout this Article I refer to the prosecutor in the female gender.
For balance, I treat the other actors in the process (e.g., judges, defense counsel, witnesses, and
defendants) as male.
6. These are, of course, areas in which the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is more evident
than in the trial context. Scholars have attempted to develop guidelines and models for what prosecutors should do in charging, plea bargaining, and (to a limited extent) sentencing. See authorities cited infra note 19. When addressing trial conduct, however, authorities have looked only to
the constitutional issues raised by prosecutorial misconduct, such as whether emotional summations violate due process, and whether selection of jurors on the basis of race violates equal protection. See infra notes 219-21, 230, 235 and accompanying text. Most commentators fail to recognize
that prosecutors' ethical obligations may differ from their constitutional responsibilities.
Even when courts and commentators have addressed the prosecutor's subconstitutional trial
obligations, they have shared the codes' tendency to speak in lofty, but undefined, "justice" terms.
Consider, for example, the oft-quoted passage from Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935):
"[The prosecution's interest] is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done ...
[The prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Id. at 88; see also J. DOUGLASS,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 7-20 (1988) (quoting various famous but generalized formulations

of the "prosecutor must do justice" concept); Frampton, Some Practicaland Ethical Problems of
ProsecutingPublic Officials, 36 MD. L. REv. 5, 7 (1976) (discussing prosecutor's role as administrator of the criminal justice system); cf. Alschuler, CourtroomMisconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial
Judges, 50 Tx. L. REv. 629, 633 & n.16 (1972) (arguing that "the prosecutor should be afforded
less leeway in his courtroom conduct than the defense attorney").
7. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976). As the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted in United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988):
The Constitution defines only the "minimal historic safeguards" which defendants must receive rather than the outer bounds of those we may afford them. In other words, the Constitution prescribes a floor below which prosecutions may not fall, rather than a ceiling beyond
which they may not rise. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, on the other hand,
.. . is designed to safeguard the integrity of the profession and preserve public confidence in
our system of justice. . . . Hence, the Code secures protections not contemplated by the
Constitution.
Id. at 859 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1983) (reversing on grounds of harmless error appellate court's exercise of "supervisory authority" to control repeated prosecutorial misconduct); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (warning courts
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The codes' failure to define prosecutors' ethical obligations at trial
has significant costs. As "professionals," prosecutors probably are capable of exercising discretionary judgment in a manner consistent with
general norms of behavior." The "do justice" standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm. Its vagueness leaves prosecutors with only
their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct." Some will
decide that justice lies in conviction at all cost;10 others will bend over
backwards to vindicate defendants' rights-in the process underestimating their obligation to the community to assure that criminals are
convicted. 1 The result is inconsistent trial practice, both within a single
prosecutor's case load and among lawyers in the prosecution corps.
This vagueness also undermines professional discipline of
prosecutorial misconduct. Commentators decry the alternative policing
mechanism-appellate reversals for failure of due process or for violations of defendants' individual rights.12 Constitutional appeals neither
guide prosecutors who overestimate their obligations to defendants nor
effectively rein in overaggressive attorneys.13 Yet the lack of enforceable
of appeal not to correct prosecutorial misbehavior in state courts absent a specific constitutional
violation).
This Article does not focus on alternative mechanisms that might be effective in controlling
prosecutorial behavior. Modified constitutional standards could work. Legislators also might adopt
specific fines or sanctions for specific prosecutorial acts, perhaps in the vein of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, courts might use their supervisory and contempt
authority more expansively to deter misconduct. It is beyond this Article's scope to compare the
relative merits of such remedies. Rather, the Article starts from the premise that ethical rules are
intended to be a "primary constraint and that code drafters want them to be effective.
8. See Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1090-1113, 1131-35
(1988).
9. See Frampton, supra note 6, at 8 ("more often than not, the prosecutor is thrown back
on his own subjective values").
10. See Felkenes, The Prosecutor:A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U.L. Rav. 98 (1975) (empirical
study showing tendency of prosecutors toward "conviction psychology").
11. See Adlerstein, Ethics,FederalProsecutors,and Federal Courts:Some Recent Problems,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 758 (1978) (community's interests are disserved when prosecutors favor
undeserving persons).
12. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6, at 631 & n.8; Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal
Prosecutors-andHow It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968).
13. Reversal for misconduct is rare. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 631 (noting the infrequency of reversals for prosecutorial misconduct in Texas courts despite large number of claims);
see also Gersbman, The Burger Court and ProsecutorialMisconduct, 21 ClaM. L. BULL. 217, 218
(1985) (recent Supreme Court decisions "evince a consistent, unyielding philosophy of judicial permissiveness toward prosecutorial excesses"). Courts are loath to set guilty defendants free. See
Carey, The Role of a Prosecutor in a Free Society, 12 CalM. L. BULL. 317, 323 (1976) ("courts,
understandably reluctant to free a guilty criminal, accept the prosecutor's pleas that the error was
harmless"); Celebrezze, ProsecutorialMisconduct: Quelling the Tide of Improper Comment to the
Jury, 35 CLav. ST. L. REv. 237, 238 (1987) ("courts are placed in the uncomfortable position of
condemning the prosecutor's behavior while affirming the conviction"). Constitutional limits on
conduct do not encompass all unethical behavior. See Hammad, 846 F.2d at 858 (describing the
limited relationship between constitutional and ethical standards); Frampton, supra note 6, at 8
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ethical standards, together with discipliners' natural hesitation to interfere with governmental actors, has prevented disciplinary bodies
from
14
sanctioning prosecutors for violating the professional codes.
This Article attempts to clarify the sense of justice to which the
codes refer. It concludes that "justice" has two fairly limited prongs: (1)
prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a good faith belief
that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must ensure that the
basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial. The Article goes
on to identify the building blocks of the adversary system and explains
how referring to them can help prosecutors, discipliners, and
rulemakers 15 develop the ethics of prosecutorial trial conduct.
The Article's interpretation of the codes' "justice" terminology is
not intended to provide a touchstone for judicial enforcement. 6 Defin(noting the failure of court decisions and codes to address the difficult ethical decisions prosecutors
must make). The constitutional standards themselves are circumscribed by the harmless error rule.
See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (applying the harmless error rule to
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument); cf. Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 553-54 (1969) (suggesting the need for
an automatic reversal rule for some forms of prosecutorial misconduct).
Scholars also have noted that, because appellate decisions do not impact directly on offending
prosecutors, the decisions may have little effect on prosecutorial behavior. See, e.g., Genson &
Martin, The Epidemic of ProsecutorialCourtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start
Prosecuting the Prosecutors?,19 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 39, 56 (1987); Steele, UnethicalProsecutorsand
Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 976 (1984); cf. Adlerstein, supra note 11, at 757-58 ("No
single prosecution is worth the loss of credibility and status that will attend the dismissal of a case
for even an unwitting breach of standards") (footnote omitted); Alschuler, supra note 6, at 646-47
(noting reasons why reversals "might influence prosecutors more than . . . police officers").
14. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.2, at 761 n.49 (1986) ("discipline is
rarely visited on prosecutors"); Alschuler, supra note 6, at 670-73 (discussing the failure of bar
grievance committees to discipline prosecutors); Carey, supra note 13, at 323 (citing a 25-year New
York study disclosing no instances "where a prosecutor had been held in contempt for professional
misconduct" and noting equal rarity of disciplinary sanctions); Genson & Martin, supra note 13, at
56 (study finds only one case in which a court "imposed disciplinary sanctions against a prosecutor
for forensic misconduct"); Gershman, supra note 13, at 224-25 (instances of discipline are "astonishingly low"); see also In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 706, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (1976) (noting that this
case was the first in the United States involving a charge of ethical violation in plea bargaining).
Though disciplinary committees infrequently sanction ordinary lawyers, the occasional disciplinary
actions serve notice that the rules have force and develop their meaning.
15. This Article refers, throughout, to the professional "codes" and "code drafters." Much of
the discussion about the codes applies equally to internal standards of conduct adopted by
prosecutorial agencies, at least to the extent that these standards rely on "justice" terminology. My
references to code drafters thus should be read, when appropriate, as referring also to the promulgators of administrative standards for prosecutorial behavior.
16. It is important to recognize that the ethical rule requiring prosecutors to "do justice" is
not coextensive with legal standards for prosecutorial behavior. When courts discuss justice in the
context of constitutional fair trial requirements, they focus on a separate norm. Judges may take
the prdfessional codes into account in determining the process due. Cf., e.g., MacArthur v. Bank of
New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (referring to professional codes in deciding civil
motion to disqualify opposing counsel). But courts carefully have avoided treating all deficiencies
in trials as giving rise to enforceable claims by defendants that their rights have been violated. See
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ing the ethical standard, however, should help prosecuting attorneys react to ethical dilemmas they confront in trial practice. On a larger scale,
it will enable federal agencies and local district attorneys offices to provide guidance for their staffs in training programs and in establishing
internal norms. Spelling out the meaning of the "do justice" rule also
may provide a somewhat improved basis for professional discipline
when individual prosecutors overstep their bounds.
Perhaps more importantly, the Article highlights a need for precise
ethical directives, either through formal rules or, when flexibility is desirable, rebuttable presumptions. 17 The presence of a high-minded but

overly general "justice" rule masks the difficulty of regulating
prosecutorial trial conduct. By analyzing how the prevailing rule works
in specific trial scenarios, the Article demonstrates that even a well-interpreted "do justice" standard may fall short. The Article suggests
abandonment of that sweeping formula and provides a framework
rulemakers can use to develop more specific, coherent ethical rules.
II.

THE MEANING OF JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF ADVERSARIAL TRIALS

One obvious concern underlying the prosecutor's special ethical
duty is to prevent punishment of innocent defendants."" At the charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing stages, the heart of the codes' mandate to do justice seems clear: the prosecutor should exercise discretion
so as to prosecute only persons she truly considers guilty, and then only
in a manner that fits the crime. 9 Many codes reinforce the prosecutor's
Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads and New Paths-A Dead End?, 86
CoLuM. L. REv. 9, 114 (1986) (discussing courts' resistance to "constitutionalization" of trial errors). Sometimes due process requires more of prosecutors than the ethical "do justice" rule, and
sometimes it requires less.
17. See Simon, supra note 8, at 1132 (discussing expression of rules as rebuttable presumptions). In referring throughout this Article to new "rules" that code drafters might promulgate, I
do not intend to suggest rigid provisions. For some areas of prosecutorial conduct, strict instructions to prosecutors might be appropriate; in other areas, presumptions or more general standards
of appropriate conduct may be more useful because of the variety of issues that prosecutors face.
The references to new "rules" merely allude to provisions that provide significant guidance on how
prosecutors should behave in particular categories of situations.
18. The codes incorporate the notion that government lawyers should decline or limit prosecution at the pretrial stage if a particular defendant is patently innocent. See, e.g., CODE, supra
note 1, DR 7-103(A) (a prosecutor "shall not institute. . . criminal charges when he knows or it is
obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause"); accord MODEL RULES, supra note
1, Rule 3.8(a).
19. In the pretrial context, doing justice thus requires a prosecutor to predict the appropriate
result. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935). Prosecutors play a similar "judging
role" in recommending sentences and in considering whether newly discovered evidence justifies a
new trial. See Felkenes, supra note 10, at 110 (securing "release of the innocent" is one of the
prosecutor's "major functions"); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1168 (1973) (noting that the prosecutor's
obligations "to protect the innocent. . . require the prosecutor to sift and evaluate evidence," but
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general obligation with specific rules limiting pretrial conduct along
these lines.20
Once a case reaches trial, this duty is no longer very meaningful.
The prosecutor already has made her good faith determination that the
defendant is guilty.2 1 Unless some unexpected development makes her
reconsider her conclusion, she may pursue a conviction.22 Thus, in extending the prosecutor's justice obligation to the trial stage, the codes
almost by definition intend a higher obligation than simply avoiding
unjustified prosecutions. The American Bar Association (ABA) proposed specific standards for trial conduct in the 1970s, but these standards were not adopted in the later Model Rules.2" All modern codes
are silent on the meaning of justice at trial.2
Reputable scholars have advanced the proposition that the adversary system is ineffective in producing accurate verdicts. 5 Interpreting
the codes from that perspective, one might assume that "doing justice"
not to "regard himself as the sole arbiter of truth and justice").
20. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8 (listing limited ethical obligations of a
prosecutor); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-103(A) (limiting the prosecutor's ability to institute unsupported criminal charges), DR 7-103(B) (mandating the disclosure of exculpatory evidence).
21. I do not focus here on the precise standard for the prosecutor's determination. Arguably,
she may need only to decide that the evidence warrants bringing the case to a jury for determination. Most prosecutors, however, go further; they satisfy themselves that the particular defendant
is the person who committed the crime. See authorities cited infra note 259.
22. Occasionally, prosecutors develop doubts about the merits of their case in the middle of
trial. This may occur either because of newly discovered evidence that arises independently or in
the defendant's presentation, or because the preexisting evidence suddenly appears less trustworthy. When this occurs, the prosecutor, of course, must take into account the same justice considerations she initially considered at the pretrial stage.
23. The ABA's attempt to construct formalized, comprehensive rules is found in ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

(1971). The ABA updated these standards in 1979. See ABA STANDARDS, infra note 131. The membership declined to incorporate those rules into the subsequent Model Rules, probably because of a
perceived difficulty in anticipating all ethical questions that prosecutors may face, a recognition
that anything but a general rule would have to be drafted carefully, and a sense that the lack of a
coherent theory justifying the ruleswould render each rule subject to dispute by special interest
lobbies.
24. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility list a few pretrial responsibilities that carry over to the trial stage: (1) a prosecutor must
refrain from prosecuting unsupported charges, MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8(a); CODE,
supra note 1, DR 7-103(A); (2) a prosecutor must assure that the defendant has had an opportunity to exercise procedural rights, MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rules 3.8(b), (c); and (3) a prosecutor must make some disclosures of information, MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8(d); CODE,
supra note 1, DR 7-103(B). Both codes also limit public statements by prosecutors and defense
attorneys, see MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.6; CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-107(A), but neither
elaborates on the prosecutor's special obligations to do justice at the trial stage.
25. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, THE ADvERsARY SYSTEM. A DESCRIPrTON AND DEFENSE 36-37 (1984)
(explaining why the adversary system cannot be justified as a mechanism for determining "truth");
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 A. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 549-50 (noting the
inability of the adversary system to work in criminal cases because of an inherent inequality of
resources between the parties).
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requires prosecutors to temper their zeal. One can hypothesize openminded prosecutors who present facts neutrally and encourage courts
and jurors to emphasize defendants' procedural rights. These idealized
government attorneys constantly would reevaluate the strength of their
case. They would adjust the content and force of each evidentiary presentation to further the outcome that they believe the jury should reach
on the current state of the evidence.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether adversarial
theory is essentially flawed, whether the image of prosecutorial nonpartisanship is realistic, or whether prosecutors and all other lawyers have
uncodified obligations to bring about socially beneficial results.2" For
our purposes, it suffices to recognize that the noncompetitive approach
to prosecutorial ethics is inconsistent with the professional codes' underlying theory. The codes are concerned specifically with structuring
adversarial practice. They do not exempt prosecutors from the requirements of zealous advocacy. Reading the cursory "do justice" language
as a denunciation of competitive fact-finding therefore would create an
internal contradiction.
By including government attorneys within the general adversarial
framework, the codes signal that prosecutors can achieve justice while
operating within the adversary system's rules. Government trial lawyers, like defense counsel, influence jury verdicts through effective lawyering. Better performance makes conviction more likely, regardless of
the defendant's guilt or innocence.2 7 That reality is consistent with the
core of the adversary process: advocates are meant to do their best.2" To
the extent prosecutors temper advocacy on the basis that adversarial
contests routinely produce poor outcomes, they call into question the
essential assumptions of the very system the rules codify.
26. In his seminal article on ethical discretion in lawyering, William H. Simon posits that the
ability to exercise ethical discretion is implicit in being a professional. See generally Simon, supra
note 8; see also Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1018-35 (1990) (supporting author's previously proposed "conception" of lawyers as "moral activists"). Simon argues that private lawyers
and prosecutors should (and do) adjust the nature of their advocacy depending on context. Simon,
supra note 8, at 1090. This Article does not focus on that contention, but rather seeks to determine
how the prevailing codes require prosecutors, in particular, to act. Absent an expressed intention
to depart from the adversarial approach that governs the codes, the do justice requirement should
be interpreted in light of adversarial norms.
27. The prosecutor's skill at any stage of the proceedings may contribute to the conviction of
an innocent defendant. The ability to persuade a jury through argument or examination depends
only in part on the evidentiary ammunition at the prosecutor's disposal. Guilty verdicts represent
the cumulative effect of the strength of the evidence and the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's
presentation throughout the trial.
28. When advocates combat each other, the system presumes that truth and fairness will
result and that courts will learn of and protect against violations of defendants' rights.
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"Justice" must have a special interpretation in the context of the
adversary system. Read as a whole, the codes suggest an adversarial
view of justice rather than a separate, outcome-oriented ideal.2 9 Only
with this orientation could code drafters realistically expect prosecutors
to be able to do justice and still act as aggressive trial advocates.3 0 To
identify the content of the adversarial justice approach, the following
sections compare the rules that govern most lawyers-civil attorneys
and defense counsel-and consider why the professional codes treat
prosecutors differently.
A.

The Adversary System's General Approach to Lawyer Ethics

All United States jurisdictions incorporate adversarial process as a
basic foundation of their professional responsibility codes. Lawyers'
paramount duties are to their clients: attorneys must pursue client interests zealously,3 1 remain loyal at all times,3 and maintain client
secrets.33 The different jurisdictions adopt a variety of constraints on
lawyer behavior,3 but these are narrow and specific.3 5 For the most
29. See D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50 (1988) ("the law of procedure defines and delimits the lawyer's role [and] it is to this body of law that the lawyer [arguably] owes her primary
allegiance . . ."). Adversary theory rests on notions of competition between the parties. Yet an
adversary process is not, at least in the ideal, a no-holds-barred battle to victory or defeat. Conduct is permissible to the extent it furthers the ends of the system-not just vindicating the innocent and convicting the guilty, but doing so within procedural constraints that promote factual
accuracy, completeness, and fairness. Cf. Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for
Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 447 (1990) (arguing that the "role of lawyer as zealous
advocate" can be limited without "wholesale abandonment of the adversarial ideal").
30. Intuition suggests that we should be able to identify this special form of justice. Most
prosecutors' ideal trial would consist of more than simply obtaining a "correct" verdict-that is,
convicting a defendant whom the prosecutor believes to be guilty. Even a prosecutor consumed by
conviction psychology would agree that she cannot always be certain of guilt. Typical lawyers justify their participation in convicting potentially innocent defendants in close cases through the
notion that the defendants receive a "fair trial." The least troubling case is one in which a defendant is well represented, the trial has been fought hard, the judge's rulings have upheld the defendant's rights, and the jury nonetheless has found for the prosecution. In contrast, .a prosecutor is
unlikely to feel that she has contributed to justice when she overwhelms the defense by virtue of
superior trial skills and tactics.
31. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.3 comment (providing that a lawyer should act
"with zeal"); CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1 (providing that a lawyer's judgment "should be exercised
...solely for the benefit of his client"), EC 7-1 (providing that a lawyer's duty is "to represent his
client zealously").
32. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7 comment ("loyalty is an essential element in
the lawyer's relationship to a client"); CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1 (emphasizing the duty of
loyalty).
33. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (dealing with the preservation of confidentiality); CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101 (same).
34. For example, lawyers may not commit fraud upon a person or triLunal, MODEL RULES,
supra note 1, Rule 3.3; CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(B), assert frivolous legal arguments, MODEL
RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.1; CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(2), or disobey court orders to
reveal information, CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(C)(2).
35. The obligation to avoid "fraud upon a person or tribunal," for example, may be limited
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part, the assumption is that aggressive, competitive lawyering, guided
exclusively by client interests, produces appropriate results.
This emphasis on adversary process stems initially from the view

that legal combat is the best method for arriving at truth.3 6 Partisan
advocacy enables judges and juries to see controversies from the litigants' perspectives;3 7 it ensures that fact finders will not overlook obscure but relevant information." A point-counterpoint method of
proceeding also helps achieve unprejudiced adjudication. Empirical evidence suggests that once a judge or fact finder adopts a
bias-tentatively decides an issue in favor of one party-it becomes difficult to change that opinion. 9 By introducing dispute at each stage of
the proceedings (for example, through cross-examination and counterarguments), adversarial presentation tends to keep tribunals uncommitted until all the evidence is in.4"
Nevertheless, as David Luban4 ' and other commentators 42 have
by the lawyer's duty to maintain privileged and confidential information. See CODE, supra note 1,
DR 7-102(B)(1). Likewise, the prohibition against asserting frivolous legal arguments is weakened
through a "good faith" provision. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.1; CODE, supra note 1,
DR 7-102(A)(2). The duty to submit to court orders is tempered by the obligation of zealous representation, see supra note 31, which requires the lawyer to contest such orders if doing so is in the
client's interests.
36. Arguably, the adversary system parallels the methodology of hard science, in which scientists expose their conclusions to peers who attempt to discredit the findings. A point-counterpoint
process ferrets out erroneous positions and keeps the proponents of a theory on their toes.
37. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 25, at 4 (adversary system "affords the decision maker the
advantage of seeing what each litigant believes to be his most consecuential proof"); Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (H. Berman rev. ed 1971) ("The judge cannot
know how strong an argument is until he has heard it from the lips of one who has dedicated all
the powers of his mind to its formulation").
38. See Freedman, The ProfessionalResponsibility of the ProsecutingAttorney, 55 GEo. L.J.
1030 (1967).
39. See Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386, 399-401 (1972) (empirical study which concludes that the adversarial
system moderates effect of initial biases).
40. See id. at 401; see also Fuller, supra note 37, at 44 ("[t]he arguments of counsel hold the
case. . . in suspension between two opposing interpretations. . . [so] there is time to explore all
of its peculiarities and nuances"); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 121 (1978) ("psychology of decision making" suggests that "it is better to have conflicting preliminary hypotheses
and supporting proofs presented by the parties so that the judge's mind can be kept open until all
the evidence is at hand").
41. Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERs' ETHICS 83, 92 (D. Luban ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER] ("the adversary system is
justified, not because it is a good way of achieving justice, but because it is a good way of hobbling
the government and we have political reasons for wanting this").
42. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, supra note 25, at 36-37 (noting that "truth" is an unrealistic
objective of the adversary system); Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System,
in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 41, at 123, 126 (suggesting that the adversary system is not
justifiable on the basis of truth-seeking, but rather as a means of ensuring human dignity);
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pointed out, law's version of adversary process may not be an effective
method for achieving accurate verdicts. 4 The view that a process of
contradiction alone exposes truth is counter-intuitive and, at least in
some circumstances, simply wrong." Proponents of adversariness therefore have looked to alternative justifications to support the system.
One rationale is that adversary process assures procedural fairness,
including assertion of all the parties' rights. 5 Aligning attorneys solely
with their clients' interests creates an incentive for lawyers to be activea and to take full advantage of the law's protections.47 Ensuring
that the parties' views are presented-even if extreme-may make the
parties feel as if the legal system has treated them evenhandedly.4 8 Not
only is that sense of fairness an independent "good," but ultimately, it
helps some litigants accept even unfavorable results.4 9
Proponents also argue that the system is an efficient mechanism for
resolving disputes. Adversarial process causes lawyers to frame and narrow the issues for the fact finder5 0 and creates a system of checks and
balances. The attorneys keep an eye on one another and on the judge to
make sure that they all perform their assigned roles in proper and ethiSaltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 651-54 (1986)
("The American adversary system is misdescribed as a search for truth").
43. Unlike science, the law "proceed[s] by advancing conjectures that the [proponent] knows
to be false and then using procedural rules to exclude probative evidence." Luban, supra note 41,
at 94. The scientific dialogue remains a cooperative process in which the scientific community is
prepared to seek agreement.
44. Id.; cf. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1982) ("if the central goal is truth-seeking, why should the
prosecutor ... not have the responsibility for putting all the evidence on the table...?").
45. See, e.g., A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 117 (1980) (noting that the virtue of the adversary system is not to obtain "truth," and discussing other explanations for the system); G. HAZARD, supra note 40, at 129 (the "real value of [the] adversary system
...
[may be] its contribution to the ideal of individual autonomy"); Alschuler, supra note 6, at
637 ("the adversary system reflects an intelligent division of labor in marshaling relevant evidence
....
[It] does not rest upon the proposition that truth is most likely to emerge"); Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor,17 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 532 (1983) (the adversary criminal trial is an "expression of social values of fairness ... representing the vindication
of individual liberties").
46. See G. HAZARD, supra note 40, at 133 ("the trial lawyer can become comjletely immersed
in his own lawsuits, to the point where they become his identity and their outcome the sole criterion of his professional stature"); S. LANDSMAN, supra note 25, at 4 (the structure of the adversary
system "encourages the adversaries to find and present their most persuasive evidence").
47. See Luban, supra note 41, at 98.
48. See G. HAZARD, supra note 40, at 121-22 (noting the argument that the adversary system
gives a party a "sense of involvement and control in the decision procedure"); J. THIEAUT & L.
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 73 (1975) (empirical study comparing adversary and inquisitorial
systems and finding that parties in the adversary system are more satisfied overall, think they are
"treated more humanely and with greater dignity," and believe adversary procedure to be rela-

tively fair).
49.
50.

See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 10.1, at 565.
Id. § 10.1, at 566.
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cal fashion. 1
When the various justifications for the adversary system are considered as a whole, one can see that the "justice" it strives for has several elements. Ascertaining the true facts is not the only or paramount
goal. Fairness and respect for client individuality play an equal part,
even though full assertion of client rights may interfere with truth-seeking. Efficient fact-finding also is an important objective.
B. How ProsecutorsFit Within the Adversarial Scheme
To the extent that the adversary system works according to theory,
government lawyers promote justice by playing the same role at trial as
private advocates. They contribute to truth by defending their own factual hypotheses and contesting those of their opponents. Prosecutors
help courts assess defendants' rights; the claims of defendants' champions must be contested to determine their validity. Prosecutors also enhance the efficiency aspects of the process by acting adversarially. By
challenging defense counsels' positions at every step, prosecutors force
defenders to remain vigilant and to frame the issues clearly for proper
adjudication.
At one level, the prosecutor thus helps achieve the appropriate systemic results-does adversarial justice-simply by performing as an aggressive advocate. In the context of an adversarial model of
adjudication, even prosecutors who develop "conviction psychology"5
seem justified; ordinarily it is not up to a lawyer to act contrary to her
side's interests. 5 Having proceeded to trial, the prosecutor represents
the community's interest in conviction." Court-enforced constitutional
51. See Luban, supra note 41, at 101-02 (describing a checks-and-balances justification for
adversarial process and arguing that it fails on moral and effectiveness grounds).
52. See, e.g., Felkenes, supra note 10, at 121 (empirical study suggesting that many prosecutors develop "conviction psychology"); Singer, supra note 12, at 227-29 (discussing reasons for
prosecutorial emphasis on obtaining convictions).
53. Cf. Uviller, supra note 19, at 1159 (cautioning against "overplaying" prosecutors' quasijudicial role and urging that prosecutors act primarily as zealous advocates).
54. As a practical matter, both prosecutors and the public expect zeal from the criminal justice arm of the government. Defendants have their attorneys. These attorneys take full advantage
of the trial process, including the manipulation of legal technicalities. Prosecutors have the job of
evening out the battle. As one former Assistant United States Attorney states:
[A]s trial approaches and we see justice fighting a losing battle as the evidence is whittled
away, we become more and more aggressive in our protection of the case that we believe to be
right. Finally, at trial, when false issues are injected, unfair attacks are made on the witnesses,
or perjured testimony is given by a defendant trying to lie his way out of a just conviction, the
prosecutor becomes the most zealous champion of justice you can imagine. He is then a fullfledged fighting advocate; and he should be.. . . His job is now to fight fairly and firmly with
all his might to see that truth and justice prevail.
Seymour, Why ProsecutorsAct Like Prosecutors,11 Rac. AB.CrrY N.Y. 302, 313 (1956); see also
Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 651, 656 (taking the position that the differences between the roles of
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safeguards (such as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard) arguably
suffice to protect the innocent.
The notion that a prosecutor sometimes should refrain from acting
as a pure advocate stems from the fact that she has no single client.5
The prosecutor is simultaneously responsible for the community's protection, victims' desire for vengeance, 56 defendants' entitlement to a fair
opportunity for vindication,57 and the state's need for a criminal justice
system that is efficient and appears fair."" Described accurately, the
prosecutor represents "constituencies"-and several of them at one
time. 59
This multirepresentation is significant for the structure of
prosecutorial ethics. Private lawyers confronting ethical dilemmas usually find themselves torn between promoting a single client's goals and
safeguarding their own professional or moral self-interest. The disciplinary rules resolve these conflicts largely by casting trial lawyers as
agents who must champion client interests, subject only to narrow lim60
its on extreme behavior.
Prosecutors, in contrast, face conflicts among their constituents' inprosecutors and defense counsel are "overstated" and "misdescribed" and that the prosecution
should present the "strongest argument" for conviction); Uviller, supra note 19, at 1159, 1168 (arguing that the prosecutor should act as advocate as long as she "fairly lays the matter before the
judge or jury" and that zealous prosecutors "fulfill a role as advocate in a dialectic system for the
divination of truth"); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's
Closing Argument, 64 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 & n.2 (1973) (the prosecutor's "primary duty

is to earnestly and vigorously present the government's case, using every legitimate means to bring
about a conviction").
55. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 45, at 513 (explaining that the prosecutor makes decisions
that the client ordinarily would make); Frampton, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that the prosecutor is
"the lawyer and the client rolled into one"); Freedman, supra note 38, at 1033 (noting that there
are fewer constraints on prosecutorial ethics because the prosecutor represents no private client).
56. Victims also may have an interest in venting their pain by being heard and in obtaining
closure to an unpleasant experience.
57. See Defoor, supra note 2, at 448 (discussing the prosecutor's duty to mitigate guilt under
Florida law).
58.

See Corrigan, On ProsecutorialEthics, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 537, 538-39 (1986) (stat-

ing that the prosecutor speaks for police, victim, defendant, defendant's family, those who care
about the defendant, and citizens as a whole). The community interests include vindicating a potentially tyrannical grand jury process through which the government accuses citizens and forces
them to defend their conduct, promoting respect for the law, and legitimizing the criminal justice
system in the community's eyes.
59. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 13.10.1, at 759 (describing the prosecutor's "constituents"); Vess, supra note 54, at 22 & n.1 (the defendant is a "member of the prosecutor's broad
constituency"); see also Defoor, supra note 2, at 448 (noting the prosecutor's obligations to the
court and jurors).
60. See Simon, supra note 8, at 1085 (discussing traditional "libertarian" ideal in which "the
only ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer's role is loyalty to the client"); Luban, supra note 26, at
1015 (noting that standard conception of lawyer as nonaccountable advocate for clients remains
prevalent in the context of criminal defense and "large-firm" practice).
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terests as well as between constituent and personal interests. Code
drafters could have used an agency analysis to shape prosecutorial ethics. The rules simply could state which constituent's interests take precedence in particular situations.6 1 The decision not to codify priorities
reflects the drafters' sense that prosecutors' multirepresentational role
requires an independent framework for governing prosecutorial
0 2

conduct.

The framework that the drafters have chosen consists primarily of
the "do justice" rule. The prosecutor's relative independence provides a
theoretical justification for the rule's departure from adversarial norms.
As discussed above, drafters committed to the adversary system would
not expect the advocate for the prosecution routinely to disavow zeal.
But because a prosecutor need not focus exclusively on a single client's
interests, her role in promoting the system's goals of procedural fairness
and efficient fact-finding becomes more dominant. The code envisions
limited circumstances in which she can temper her competitive spirit,
yet still contribute to results that the adversary system deems
appropriate.
While prosecutorial autonomy helps justify a less adversarial
framework, the fear of unfettered prosecutorial power is the impetus for
the special ethical obligation. The prosecutor's freedom from client control gives rise to vast discretion. That, in turn, creates a risk that
prejudice or self-interest will govern her decisions. She may arbitrarily
favor one defendant, or type of defendant, over others. Alternatively,
because her success is measured by her conviction rate, 3 she may be
61. For example, the codes easily could inform prosecutors that their first obligation at trial
is to represent the victims aggressively. At the other extreme, if the drafters wanted prosecutors to
act less than adversarially on the basis that defendants' interests are primary, the codes could
instruct prosecutors to use only facts that they know to be true and to present them evenhandedly.
Under this approach, it would make sense to differentiate priorities, depending on the stage of
proceedings at which the prosecutor appears.
62. William Simon recently has challenged the traditional client-centered ethical norms, arguing that all lawyers should have as a basic consideration "whether assisting the client would
further justice." Simon, supra note 8, at 1085. Interestingly, Simon rests his argument partly on
the codes' requirement that prosecutors "do justice." In his view, this duty illustrates that giving
lawyers ethical discretion is not unworkable and does not necessarily give rise to arbitrary ethical
decisions. Id. at 1090.
Although I agree with the premise that doing justice can be consistent with the role of lawyers
in an adversary system, I perceive significant practical constraints on a generalized "do justice"
principle. As Simon himself recognizes, private lawyers would have difficulty obeying a justice
standard because of the conflict with their duty to clients. See id. at 1114, 1123. I am also more
skeptical than Simon about the value of an abstract principle for prosecutors. This Article seeks to
define prosecutors' obligations precisely because, in practice, prosecutors either have ignored the
mandate to "do justice" or have implemented it haphazardly.
63. For elected prosecutors, publicity about trial successes is essential to campaigns. For
subordinate prosecutors in larger offices, promotion and internal evaluation depends largely on the
ability to produce convictions.
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tempted to ignore the rights of defendants, victims, or the community
in order to obtain pleas or guilty verdicts.
Moreover, the prosecutor benefits from unique prestige and symbolic power. Because she represents the community, she commonly carries more influence with juries than attorneys allied solely with
individual clients. 4 The prosecutor can rely on jurors' natural instincts
to be protected against crime. She can draw upon jurors' tendencies to
believe that persons a grand jury singles out for prosecution probably
are guilty.6 5
Finally, a prosecutor enjoys practical advantages over her adversaries. She benefits from the state's hefty investigative and litigation
resources.6 " Through the police and grand jury, she monopolizes the
ability to coerce testimony and obtain cooperation in the investigation
of crimes.67 The literature is replete with discussions of ways in which a
prosecutor can misuse her singular tools. 6 8
The fear of prosecutorial abuses thus explains why code drafters
have chosen to adopt a "do justice" obligation. The drafters reasonably
expect that,, as the symbol of fair criminal justice, prosecutors should
not take undue advantage of their built-in resources. Prosecutors who
overreach undermine "confidence, not only in [their] profession, but in
64. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 632 ("a prosecutor usually benefits [before the jury] from
his association with ... law enforcement"); Civiletti, The Prosecutor As Advocate, 25 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 1, 20 (1979) (a federal prosecutor "carries with him the institutional credibility of the
Department of Justice").
65. Civiletti, supra note 64, at 20.
66. See Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practiceof Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 41, at 172, 177.
67. Id.
68. The list of potential abuses is endless. For example, a prosecutor may gain a tactical
advantage at trial by referring to her decision to grant immunity to prosecution witnesses. See
Note, Accomplice Testimony and Credibility:"Vouching" and ProsecutorialAbuse of Agreements
to Testify Truthfully, 65 MiNN. L. REV. 1169, 1170-76 (1981); cf. Note, Prosecutor'sRefusal to
Grant Immunity to Defense Witness Remains Unreviewable, 19 WASHBuRN L.J. 144, 146 & n.19
(1979) (noting that prosecutorial decisions, such as a refusal to grant immunity to a defense witness, are not subject to judicial review). The prosecutor may use her charging, plea bargaining, and
sentencing discretion to extract pleas or agreements from defendants not to exercise certain rights,
see generally Schwartz, The Limits of ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 69 IowA L. REV. 127 (1983)
(proposing prophylactic procedure to limit prosecutorial vindictiveness), or may threaten to institute prosecution to obtain concessions that she could not obtain through criminal proceedings. See
Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor:Restrictions on ThreateningProsecutionfor Civil Ends,
37 ME.L. REv. 41, 57-62 (1985) (arguing for ethical limits on this practice). At the initial stage, she
may initiate a prosecution when a fair evaluation of the evidence does not warrant prosecution.
See, e.g., Johnston, The Grand Jury-ProsecutorialAbuse of the Indictment Process,65 J. CraM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157 (1974) (discussing whether prosecutors should be required to disclose exculpatory information to grand juries); Vaira, The Role of the ProsecutorInside the Grand Jury
Room: Where is the Foul Line?, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1129 (1984) (discussing prosecutor's
role at the indictment stage); Note, Prosecuting Attorney Generally Not Obligated to Discover
and Present Evidence Favorable to the Defense, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 359 (1980) (same).
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government and the very ideal of justice itself."6"
The nature of the prosecutor's unique power also suggests that the
duty takes on special meaning at the trial stage. Aspects of
prosecutorial power-such as the unusual influence over jurors-come
into play solely at trial. Confining the codes' requirements to instituting
and maintaining prosecutions in good faith thus would understate the
drafters' concerns. 0 The "do justice" rule may not contemplate halfhearted advocacy, but it clearly addresses the use of techniques that tilt
trials toward convictions in an unfair way.71
To fix the scope of the "do justice" rule, one must consider its theoretical justification and underlying practical concerns in tandem. It
would be reading too much into two words--"do justice"-to conclude
that the rule embodies a counter-traditional theoretical conception of
prosecutors as nonadversarial lawyers. The paradigm of the prosecutor
as an unaligned "minister of the system" makes sense in the trial context only if it targets situations in which competitive fact-finding will
not produce results that are "acceptable" within the meaning of the
adversary system. Yet we have seen that when the adversary system
operates in its intended fashion, competition by definition produces appropriate results. The "do justice" rule, therefore, must focus on cases
in which the system itself is defective-in which defendants are not
tried in accordance with the system's basic, structural elements.
Interpreting prosecutors' obligation to do justice with reference to
"adequate adversarial process" rather than "accurate outcomes" helps
identify when prosecutors should depart from an advocate's stance:
prosecutors must strive for adversariallyvalid results rather than factually correct results. This systemic approach also defines limits to
prosecutors' ethical duty. The codes assign prosecutors a special role
within the system because prosecutors are unencumbered by client ties.
It follows that the codes accord prosecutors leeway to repair flaws in the
process, but impose no general duty to help defendants win.
C. Defining the Prosecutor's Duty to Do Justice at Trial
The key to understanding this adversarial interpretation of justice
is to identify the essential elements of adversarial process and isolate
69. ABA Joint Conference, supra note 2, at 1218.
70. One could interpret the "do justice" provision simply as authorizing prosecutors to determine who is potentially guilty and then to do whatever is necessary to convict. But that interpretation seems' inconsistent with the provision's lofty language. No reputable commentator has argued
that government attorneys are wholly unconstrained in their quest for victory.
71. Cf. D. LuBA, supra note 29, at 62 (noting that adversary theory's emphasis on protecting
criminal defendants' rights "can only be understood as attempts to prevent the state from obtaining even justified convictions by unacceptably invasive means").
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ways in which they may fail. When the system breaks down in a significant respect, the codes can no longer expect competition to achieve adversarially appropriate results. If the evidence is in conflict, an ethical
prosecutor cannot rationalize a conviction simply on the ground that
the trial is fair. 2
Most commentators would agree that proper operation of the adversary system rests on several basic premises. The system's underlying
theory is to make outcomes a contest and to place the fates of contestants in the hands of champions. The system necessarily presumes that
the competing attorneys will be roughly equivalent in quality 3 and possess a similar level of resources with which to pursue the litigation. 4
Counsel are expected to represent their clients' interests actively in order to maximize the law's protection of their clients' rights.
These premises do not mean that the parties and their champions
must be equal in all respects. 7 5 Inevitably, two sides to litigation will
begin with different information, strategies, and methods of pursuing
victory. Still, a fair joust requires some parity of representation.
Perhaps equally important, the system makes several assumptions
about the procedures through which the contest will be determined.
The tribunal must be neutral. 8 Because the adversaries themselves are
the means for focusing the issues and evidence, most commentators also
agree that the fact finder or adjudicator should be a passive participant
in the trial.77 A "highly structured forensic procedure" must give each
party an equal opportunity to present his version of the facts and law."'
The tribunal must reach a conclusion based solely on the issues and
7
evidence presented by the parties.
These building blocks of the adversary system define the meaning
of the codes' directive that prosecutors "do justice." If a major element
or premise of the system is absent in a particular case, the trial is un72. See id. at 79 ("You cannot argue that the adversary system works because it is selfchecking, since it is self-checking only if it works").
73. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 547 (opposing representatives "should be roughly equal
in their ability to perform their professional functions").
74. See Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 516, 518
(1976) (the system fails when parties' resources are unequal); Kutak, supranote 66, at 177 (noting
that rules limiting prosecutors' freedoms stem partly from states' unique resources); see also Levin
v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that the "fair administration of
criminal justice" requires a prosecutor's disclosure of evidence to avoid rendering criminal trial a
game in which "the one with the greater resources [is] the 'winner' ").
75. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 547 (the system does not require total parity "because
only in rare cases will the parties be equal in their presentational ability").
76. See S. LANnSMAN, supra note 25, at 2-4.
77. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
78. See id. at 4-6.
79. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 10.1, at 564.
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likely to produce an appropriate result. Unless some noncompetitive
mechanism safeguards the system, the divergence from the core expectations may undermine valid competitive adjudication."s This concept
of failed adversarial justice provides the one approach to ethical
prosecutorial trial behavior that is consistent with the thrust of the
codes: to do justice, prosecutors must help reestablish the essential adversarial balance that is missing or has been lost.
Of course, adversarial process can fail equally in civil and criminal
settings. Private and government lawyers seem to play a similar role
with respect to adversarial imbalance. It is therefore important to highlight why code drafters perceive the prosecutor's unique attributes as
justifying a special obligation to adversarial justice.
Consider a case in which a judge deprives one party of an opportunity to present the facts by cowing defense counsel into avoiding relevant lines of questioning."' Arguably, the trial does not satisfy the
adversary system's design. The premises of a passive tribunal and an
equal opportunity to put forth a case may be lacking. The litigant's capacity to obtain a systemically appropriate result is at risk.
At the trial level, at least, the injured party may have little recourse. Yet in a civil case, the professional codes do not oblige the opposing attorney to limit the possibility of an unfair outcome. The codes'
commitment to client-centered lawyering exacerbates the private attorney's natural tendency to win at all costs; the injured party alone carries the burden of correcting errors.8 s Though specific rules counteract
counsel's excesses,8 3 the codes require or allow him to treat the full as84
sertion of client interests as paramount to truth and fairness.
80. Few fail-safes exist at the trial level. The system relies largely on appeals to correct
tainted verdicts. Yet appeals are time consuming and expensive. Even if used, they often are an
inadequate remedy because appellate courts have created significant procedural obstacles to success-most notably, the harmless error rule. See supra notes 7, 13 and accompanying text. Because
appellate courts rely exclusively on written records, it is difficult for them to identify errors that
stem from the demeanor or attitudes of lawyers, judges, or jurors. The courts do not encourage
extrinsic proof on these matters because of their administrative interest in preserving finality of
verdicts.
81. For a discussion of this and other examples of judicial interference and an explanation of
why appellate remedies are inadequate to safeguard the system's intended operation, see infra
notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
82. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 25, at 5 ("the rough-and-tumble of adversary procedure
exacerbates the natural tendency of advocates to seek to win by any means available").
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., D. LUBAN, supra note 29, at 11 ("When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must,
within the established constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client
will prevail"); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not intentionally [flail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law . . ., except as provided by DR 7-101(B)") (footnotes omitted). But cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
1.3 comment (1) ("However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be
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In the criminal context, a prosecutor reasonably can be expected to
view the judicial interference differently. Ordinarily, she must compete
actively because aggressive lawyering furthers the adversary system's
goals of even-handed and efficient fact-finding. But in cases like the
hypothetical, the likelihood of achieving these goals is either threatened
or absent altogether. Free of client-centered concerns, the prosecutor
has no reason to seek advantage from the systemic breakdown, other
than a personal desire to win.8 5 She best serves her function by stepping
out of the pure advocate's role.
The prosecutor's unique prestige helps justify holding her to a
higher ethical responsibility. In the hypothetical scenario, practical considerations might prevent a private attorney from taking advantage of
the court's one-sided attitude. The attorney reasonably may fear that
the jury will perceive him to be bullying the opponent. In contrast, because a prosecutor starts out with an aura of respectability, she can get
away with more. s8 Practical limitatiQns do not restrain her conduct to
the same extent.
The prosecutor's resource advantages also weigh in favor of making
her rectify the system's failure. By virtue of her access to the grand jury
and her relationship with law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor has
an institutional identity that helps her deal with the hypothetical
judge's conduct. The judge can do without a private attorney's affection
and, consequently, may retaliate for the attorney's attempt to challenge
him. In contrast, the judge needs the prosecutor's goodwill almost as
much as the prosecutor needs his. The court must have the cooperation
of the prosecutor's office to manage the criminal justice system; offending one prosecutor may offend them all. Within limits, 8 7 the nature of
realized for a client"). In many instances, lawyers must sublimate their own sense of morality to

serve the demands and interests of clients. See, e.g., Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the
Role of the Lawyer, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 41, at 60, 67-78 (discussing lawyer role
differentiation in specific contexts); Luban, supra note 41, at 87 ("all litigators have had cases
where, in their heart of hearts, they wanted their client to lose or wished that a distasteful action
did not need to be performed [under the ethical rules]"); Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality,74
IOWA L. REv. 351, 372-74 (1989) (discussing role differentiation in the context of confidentiality
requirements in situations in which the lawyer wants to disclose client information for moral
reasons).

85. Prosecutors, of course, are expected to do a good job for the state, the victims, and defendants. But that general obligation differs from a duty of particular loyalty to one constituent.
Likewise, victim satisfaction and desire for revenge are not "client interests" within the codes'
meaning.
86. In some cases, the opposite might be true. In other words, some jurors might start from
the perspective that the prosecution is oppressive and take particular offense when the prosecutor
takes advantage of the opportunity that the judge offers in the hypothetical. In deciding whether a
rule is justified, however, the drafters must look at probabilities; more often than not, jurors will
attribute respectability to the state's conduct.
87. As a repeat performer in the courtroom, the prosecutor, of course, must take extra care to
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the prosecutor's office as the institution in charge of law enforcement
resources thus enables individual prosecutors to serve as checks on failures elsewhere in the system.
Hence, viewed from the code drafters' adversarial perspective, "justice" does take on special meaning for government attorneys. The codes
impose a different duty to role differentiate than they impose on private lawyers.m Once a prosecutor determines the prosecution should
proceed, her function is to advocate the defendant's guilt. But when the
system breaks down, she at least temporarily must set aside her view
that the defendant should be convicted. 9 Her role is not to help him
win, yet neither may she passively accept systemically faulty outcomes.
As a "minister" of the system, the codes require' her to help restore
adversarial balance.90
This model of prosecutorial ethics is appealing on several grounds.
Perhaps most significantly, it makes theoretical sense. It reconciles the
reality of modern prosecutions with the discussions of prosecutorial ethics found in the cases, commentary, and disciplinary rules.9 ' This reconciliation is consistent with our intuitive sense of what constitutes a fair
trial: one in which an innocent defendant has a full opportunity for vindication, but in which the prosecutor aggressively seeks to convict the
avoid offending the judge. That does not change the reality that she is on more equal footing with
the judge than is private counsel. To manage his courtroom, the judge must curry the prosecutor's
favor as well the other way around.
88. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
89. As noted above, some prosecutors interpret the codes' mandate to "do justice" as sanctioning the opposite of role differentiation; in each case prosecutors should do what they think is
right. See J. DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 38 ("notwithstanding the aid provided by 'written tablets'
handed down from 'on high,' prosecutors must largely rely on their own understanding, integrity
and compassion"). For many, that reduces the mandate to a creed of attempting to convict the
guilty at all costs.
90. In attempting to identify the proper ethical roles for prosecutors and other counsel, Stephen Saltzburg forecasts the model developed in this Article:
[Tihe interdependence of the lawyer's role and the functioning of the adversary system is
obvious. Lawyers should and must determine how to behave by examining the system in
which they are asked to work. If the lawyers analyze the system incorrectly and develop behavior patterns that are inconsistent with the goals of the system, they may impair the operation of the system.
Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 649.
William Simon, arguing for "ethical discretion" on the part of all lawyers, suggests a somewhat
similar approach. First, he says lawyers must adopt a "[general] style of representation that will
...best contribute to just resolutions." Then they must "watch for indications that some premise
underlying [their] judgment that the style is a good one does not apply in the particular case. ...
The lawyer should respond to such circumstances by taking reasonably available actions that help
restore the reliability of the procedure." Simon, supra note 58, at 1098. Simon, however, would go
a significant step further by imposing on the lawyer a responsibility clearly not intended by any
existing code: lawyers should "make [their] own judgment[s] about the proper substantive resolution and take reasonable actions to bring it about." Id.
91. See supra note 6.
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Structuring prosecutorial ethics upon the foundation of the adversary system also has practical benefits. It provides a somewhat more
concrete basis for resolving ethical dilemmas than do bare conceptions
of justice." Moreover, it suggests behavior that leaves intact the adversarial theory underlying the bulk of the ethical codes. The prosecutorial
duty to step out of the advocate's role is triggered by factors-case-bycase breakdowns in adversarial assumptions-that do not call into
question the system's operation in the ordinary case. As a matter of
legal interpretation and faith in the system, it is preferable to avoid
reading the codes' "do justice" mandate as a general admission that the
system does not work.
Nevertheless, in considering how prosecutors should satisfy the
mandate to pursue adversarial justice in specific cases, one must keep in
mind the malleability of the underlying standard. Adding an adversarial
gloss to the "do justice" language clarifies the codes' intent. But the
gloss itself is subject to wide interpretation, perhaps according more
latitude to prosecutors than even well-meaning "professionals" should
have.93 The inherent flexibility of "do justice" provisions, however interpreted, keeps them from effectively guiding prosecutorial behavior at
trial.9 The adversarial framework discussed in this Article thus may
work better as a blueprint for writing new rules than as a measure of
particular conduct under the old rules.
III.

ACHIEVING JUSTICE WHEN ADVERSARIAL PREMISES FAIL

Let us assume that the codes' intent is to require prosecutors to
pursue adversarial justice and that the mandate to "do justice" is the
only guide for ethical trial conduct. Precisely how should a well-intentioned prosecutor determine when adversariness in the trial process has
broken down? What steps should she take in response?
To answer these generic questions-or to see how the codes' general approach to prosecutorial ethics fails to provide answers-one must
analyze the significance of each adversarial premise and discuss specific
trial situations in which a breakdown may occur. The analysis illustrates the primary benefits of the adversarial justice interpretation: it
provides some structure for ethical decision making by individual prosecutors; as a theoretical construct for use in revising the codes, it offers
drafters a far better framework than abstract fairness notions. At the
same time, the analysis highlights the difficulty of enforcing a vague
92. Specific illustrations are considered infra Part III.
93. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Part IV.
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"do justice" concept and shows why drafters should consider more precise provisions.
A. Inequality of Adversaries and Resources
1. Poor or Lax Defense Counsel
Adversarial justice breaks down most clearly when a criminal defense attorney does not even roughly match the prosecutor's talents or
fails to represent his client's interests. Four factors can account for a
mismatch: Defense counsel simply may be a bad or indolent lawyer;
counsel may be incapacitated in the particular case (for example, by
illness, alcohol, or distractedness); he may be rendered ineffective by
lack of time or resources to prepare; or government and court actions
may constrain counsel's effectiveness (for example, by timing an indictment or trial to limit counsel's opportunity to defend).
Other than prosecutorial intervention, only two powers exist to
counteract a one-sided contest: The market for legal services and judicial oversight. Market forces help assure competent defense counsel.
Reputation prevents some clients from engaging poor or inactive attorneys. Nevertheless, in some locales, the small size of the criminal bar
and minimal compensation for defense work so restrict the supply of
lawyers that clients have no choice. Elsewhere, bad lawyers continue
practicing by obtaining appointments to represent indigent clients who
have no power of counsel selection. 5 Even if judges eventually cease
appointing these lawyers and drive them from the field,96 in the
meantime they continue to practice and to harm clients.
Legal safeguards also are inadequate. Judges have authority to disqualify defense counsel or reverse convictions in cases in which counsel
provides "ineffective assistance.

' 97

But in practice, this standard pro-

95. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (rejecting right to appointed counsel of
choice).
96. Practical and institutional considerations may prevent judges from blackballing particular attorneys. Some judges simply may not recognize poor lawyering or specific aspects of poor
lawyering. Others may prefer unaggressive attorneys who pose less of a threat of obtaining appellate reversals of the judge's decisions. For the sake of convenience or from a misplaced sense of
fairness, some courts simply may distribute appointments equally among all eligible counsel or use
an objective standard, such as seniority on the appointments list.
97. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (a right to appointed counsel implies a
right to effective counsel). If fully enforced, this standard would satisfy the requirements of adversarial justice because an "effective" defense attorney, by definition, provides the rough equivalence
of counsel that the system requires. From time to time, the United States Supreme Court has cast
the requirement of effective assistance of counsel in terms of adversarial principles. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984) ("if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated"). Generally, however, the

Court has limited itself to that aspect of adversarial procedure that seeks accuracy in verdicts. See,
e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[tlhe benchmark for judging any claim of
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vides minimal protection against incompetent and inactive lawyers.98
Appellate courts have exhibited an institutional reluctance to reverse
convictions on ineffectiveness grounds.9 9 Judges are loath to secondguess lawyer strategy. They ordinarily do not let defendants introduce
extrinsic proof of ineffectiveness. Perhaps most importantly, appellate
judges define the range of reversible error largely with reference to a
single goal of the adversarial system: obtaining correct, truthful

verdicts.100
Consequently, neither the market nor judicial review encompasses
the function that the codes assign prosecutors in reacting to unequal
contests.10 1 Ineffective assistance of counsel appeals catch some of the
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result").
98. The shortfalls of the ineffectiveness doctrine have been well documented. See generally
Y. KAMISAR. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 141-63 (6th ed. 1986); Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Berger, supra note 16, at 65-66;
Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent
Representation, 22 Am. RiM. L. REV. 181 (1984); Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv. L. REv. 633, 642-49 (1980). Even if a court is willing to
intervene, relief ordinarily occurs only at the appellate stage, after the state has incarcerated the
defendant. More importantly, absent an objection by the defendant, it may be difficult for trial or
appellate courts ever to discover instances of ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (absent special circumstances, courts need not initiate inquiry into
propriety of counsel's representation of multiple clients). Untutored defendants and those who rely
on their counsel for advice are unlikely to volunteer objections. Conduct such as inadequate investigation or advice, though theoretically actionable, is unlikely to come to the court's attention. See,
e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (recognizing inadequate investigation as possible grounds for reversal); accord United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
99. See, e.g., Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947) (noting the Supreme Court's fear of
"opening wide" the prison doors); People v. Martin, 210 Mich. 139, 141, 177 N.W. 193, 193 (1920)
(discussing the difficulty of appellate courts in determining "whether the course pursued by [defense counsel] ... was the best means of promoting his defense"); see also Berger, supra note 16,
at 65-66 & n.289 (discussing reasons for the reluctance of courts to reverse); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense RepresentationAs a Ground for Post-ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 289, 303 n.86 (1964) (same). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
100. A defendant raising a sixth amendment claim must show not only deficient performance
by counsel, but also a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland,466 U.S. at 694. In contrast, the adversarial system is not geared only,
or even primarily, to achieving accurate results. See supra subpart 11(A). As William Genego notes:
[Defense counsel's] role is not, however, to see that his or her client received a fair trial and
that a just outcome resulted. The attorney's role is to do everything ethically proper to see
that the client receives the most favorable outcome possible-whether or not it produces an
outcome which society considers just.
Genego, supra note 98, at 200 (footnote omitted); accord Berger, supra note 16, at 94 ("The lawyer
... has an overriding obligation to try to obtain advantageous results for the client, whether or
not those results are either 'just' or 'reliable' in any sense intended by the Court").
101. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, is a case in point. The Supreme Court recognized a defendants right to a "reasonably competent attorney." Yet it affirmed the conviction in a case in which,
out of a "sense of hopelessness," defense counsel failed even to inquire into the availability of
character witnesses and psychiatric evidence that might have mitigated the death penalty. Id. at
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most egregious defense performances, but do not assure adversarial justice in the routine case. Most failures of representation fall to an alternative remedial scheme, one in which prosecutors' minister of justice
personae play a part.10 2
In considering the prosecutor's ethical role in preserving adver-

sarial process, the limits to the notion of equal representation should be
kept in mind. A district attorney cannot react every time an opponent
seems relatively weak. In every case, one attorney is less qualified and
less vigorous than the other. The adversary system necessarily tolerates
a range of inequality.10 3
The constitutional minimum of a "reasonably competent attorney"
or an attorney providing counsel within "the wide range of professionally competent assistance" is a realistic standard.104 It becomes relevant
to the prosecutor's ethical obligation because courts of appeal enforce
the standard inadequately.10 5 Because a defendant's own trial lawyer is
unlikely to vindicate the right to "reasonably competent" counsel, the
even-handed operation of the adversary system is at risk. A defendant's
claims will not be presented fully unless the prosecutor or trial judge
intervenes. 06
Consider three levels of substandard defense performance:
1. Defense counsel makes no serious effort to present a competent defense because
he has no trial skills, is drunk, or is senile.
2. Defense counsel performs, but very badly. He relies on a legal theory that the
698-700. The Supreme Court was troubled by the prospect of reversing a decision whose outcome
might have been the same had defense counsel been more active. Id. at 699-700. The Court thus
attributed the affirmance to counsel's "strategic" decision. Id. at 691, 699. Looking at the matter

from the prosecutor's perspective at the trial level, however, a true adversary had no excuse for
failing to follow leads. "Washington had everything to gain and nothing to lose. ."
Genego,
supra note 98, at 197.
102. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976) (citing the "do justice" provision of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and noting that "a prosecutor stands perhaps
unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability
to professional discipline by an association of his peers").
Vivian Berger points out that Strickland did not assure high quality counsel, in part because
the Court was "necessarily expounding the Constitution"; problems arising from counsel inequality
and other breakdowns in the adversarial scheme "largely resist constitutionalization." Berger,
supra note 16, at 114. In contrast, a prosecutor's ethical obligations stem from a nonconstitutional
source.
103. See Babcock, supra note 44, at 1163 (the adversary system depends "on contestants of
fairly balanced strength").
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 690.
105. The institutional reluctance to overturn convictions and the difficulty of evaluating law-

yer performance from a written record have kept appellate courts from fully implementing the
quality requirement. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. Schwarzer, supra note 98, at 649-69 (discussing the role of the trial judge in dealing
with incompetence); Waltz, supra note 99, at 301 (noting judicial tolerance for ineffective performance); Comment, FederalHabeas Corpus-A Hindsight View of Trial Attorney Effectiveness, 27
LA. L. Rxv. 784, 787 (1967) (trial judges have a duty to ensure defense counsel's effectiveness).
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prosecutor knows to be poor and fails to ask important, relevant questions.
3. Defense counsel's direct and cross-examinations are satisfactory and make it appear that counsel is performing aggressively. Yet the prosecutor realizes that counsel has not investigated the facts, has neglected to file potentially winnable
suppression motions, and, without any apparent tactical justification, has failed repeatedly to object to harmful questions.

In the first two hypotheticals, the trial judge may be aware of defense counsel's inadequacy. The judge's duty to correct ineffective representation mitigates the prosecutor's responsibility. If, however, the
judge does not notice-or chooses to ignore-the deficiency, the prosecutor squarely confronts an .ethical dilemma: she believes the defendant
should be convicted, but knows he is not receiving "adversarial justice."
The ethical prosecutor must recognize that her familiarity with the
facts puts her in a particularly good position to recognize substandard
lawyering early in the case. 10 7 Reacting to incompetent defense representation before a verdict is rendered may preserve the integrity of the
trial process in a way that appeals cannot.
What, then, does the codes' mandate tell the prosecutor to do? Initially, she must determine whether adversarial justice requires any action at all. When a defendant receives essentially no representation, as
in the first hypothetical scenario, the clear thrust of the "do justice"
requirement is that the prosecutor must undertake remedial steps.
In the second case, the answer is not so obvious; the adversarial
justice approach merely informs the prosecutor of the considerations
she should take into account. Suppose the prosecutor knows her key
witness would offer information helpful to the defense if counsel asked
appropriate questions. In some instances, representation by a lawyer
who asks ineffective questions becomes as bad as, or worse than, having
no lawyer at all. But in general, "doing justice" does not require a prosecutor to help defense counsel frame winning cross-examination. If she
can conclude that counsel's questioning fits within the "wide range of
professionally competent assistance,"108 she plays within the rules by

letting counsel resolve the strategic choices. 10 9 Adversarial principles
107. See Genego, supra note 98, at 190-91 (discussing the failure of courts to adopt and
enforce standards for ineffectiveness, and noting the feeling of some judges that they are "unqualified to establish mandatory duties for the defense of criminal cases because they ha[ve] no experience in providing such representation").
108. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Under Strickland's new "reasonable competence" standards, failure to examine can rise to the level of ineffectiveness. Previously, courts were unwilling
to reverse on that basis alone. See Waltz, supra note 99, at 323 ("no American criminal case can be
unearthed in which the failure to cross-examine, without more" resulted in reversal); see, e.g.,
Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 91, 105 So. 2d 66, 70 (1958) (failure to cross-examine chief prosecution
witness or present any defense witnesses is not ineffective representation).
109. Any other result would require prosecutors to make unmanageable judgment calls concerning the quality of each opponent. That, in turn, would significantly disrupt the system's ability
to address a large and constant case load.
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alone do not tell the prosecutor how to make that determination.
When one analyzes the third hypothetical, adversarial justice notions are again useful, but not dispositive. Consider the defense counsel
who fails to object to questions that are prejudicial, but of doubtful
admissibility. Alternatively, suppose that counsel does not file a suppression motion that would help if successful, but would leave the defense no worse off if it fails. Because there is no plausible tactic behind
counsel's inaction, the adversarial process seems to be failing; the system depends upon active counsel who maximize protection of the defendant's rights.11 "Doing justice" requires the prosecutor at least to
consider whether she is in a unique position to perceive and remedy the
systemic breakdown before a one-sided trial results.'
That leaves the question of remedy. In each scenario, the prosecutor could balance defense counsel's performance by prosecuting less effectively. Prosecuting weakly, however, does not repair the defects in
adversarial justice; it eliminates adversariness altogether. Reduced ad110. Implicit in all of the examples discussed in this Article is the assumption that the defendant will suffer if the prosecutor takes no action. Clearly, a prosecutor's duty to adversarial
justice would not require her to step out of role for de minimis or unimportant injuries that the
defendant may incur.
111. If the argument for pretrial suppression of key evidence is strong and no strategic reason appears for counsel's failure to file a motion, counsel arguably has provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) (failure to file
motion to suppress fruits of illegal search constitutes ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
844 (1977); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 465-66, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867 (1963)
(same). But the limited possibility of appellate reversal on grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel
does not adequately safeguard the process. Courts have hesitated to reverse failures to suppress
trustworthy information on the grounds that its admission does not lessen the accuracy or "justness" of the verdict. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People
v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 22-23, 241 N.E. 425, 428-29 (1968).
Similarly, evidentiary matters arising in trial rarely result in reversal absent an objection.
Counsel usually will be considered effective as a whole, even though he did not make objections
actively; his conduct is accorded a "prespmption" of competence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (defense counsel's failure even to seek character evidence or psychiatric evaluation was a "plausible
strategic choice"); see also United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (failure
to cross-examine key witness, attributable largely to lack of pretrial preparation, held "tactical
decision" immune from reversal on appeal); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970)
(counsel's sleeping during trial not grounds for reversal). Courts occasionally reverse significant
trial errors despite the absence of objections. See, e.g., People v. Blevins, 251 IMI.381, 392-93, 96
N.E. 214, 219 (1911) (reversing trial court despite failure to object to key inadmissible evidence
because defense counsel was "inexperienced" and "ill-equipped" to handle the case). This approach, however, is "studiously restricted to situations where defense counsel is intrinsically handicapped and overmatched." Waltz, supra note 99, at 321.
The trial judge, of course, also may take steps to remedy defense counsel's deficiency. But two
factors put the prosecutor in a better position to act. First, having thought about the questioning
in advance, the prosecutor is more likely than the judge to notice defense counsel's failure to object. Second, the judge may feel constrained from interfering in the questioning on the court's own
motion; as a rule, judges are expected to remain passive participants in a trial. See supra notes 7677 and accompanying text.
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vocacy may even the contest, but not consistently with the goals underlying the ethical duty to act.
Alternatively, the prosecutor personally could make up for defense
counsel's inadequacies. If counsel's failures arise early in the trial, the
prosecutor's own witness examinations might introduce favorable testimony on the defendant's behalf.112 Similarly, the prosecutor could incorporate arguments for the defense in her own summation. When
counsel fails to object or file motions, the prosecutor can raise the issues
sua sponte.
Helping the defendant is a subset (or at least a close cousin) of
"prosecuting less effectively." At first glance, it seems equally inappropriate, for it appears to create a nonadversarial proceeding. Yet the core
of adversary theory is that the tribunal should hear a strong case for
both parties; it is not crucial which attorney puts the raw evidence on
the table. In the hypothetical scenarios, the key is whether the prosecutor who helps the defendant is still able to present her own side effectively. If she can elicit defense information while arguing against its
significance, the prosecutor maintains her role as an advocate. 1 s
In most cases, however, even ethical prosecutors will find it necessary to resist the option of assisting defendants. A prosecutor's mere
mention of a defense argument often will not emphasize adequately the
position's strength. 11 4 Conversely, prosecutors may be unable to ask defense-oriented questions or raise defense claims without breaking up
their own presentations and appearing equivocal. Moreover, if prosecutors exercise the option frequently, defense counsel will come to rely on
prosecutorial assistance. They may become lazy or avoid introducing
evidence because, tactically, the evidence will have more impact in the
midst of the prosecutor's presentation. In the long run, a prosecutorial
routine of presenting defense arguments would reduce the adversarial
nature of trials.
Thus, in situations in which a prosecutor is convinced of defense
counsel's inadequacy-such as in hypotheticals (1) and (3)-the codes
112. A problem of timing haunts this remedy. In her initial direct examinations, the prosecutor will not yet know of counsel's failure to elicit information on cross or of counsel's failure to
present evidence in rebuttal. To present the information on her own, the prosecutor may have to
reopen her presentation and recall witnesses. This procedure often would require the court's permission. As a practical matter, a prosecutor may undermine her own case by presenting rebuttal
testimony that exclusively favors the defense.
113. Cf. Simon, supra note 8, at 1098 (by "attempt[ing] first to improve the reliability of the
procedure, [the lawyer] respects the traditional premise that the strongest assurance of a just resolution is the soundness of the procedure that produced it").
114. Cf. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (noting with
displeasure the possibility that prosecutors occasionally might "oversee defense counsel's conduct
at trial-to ensure against reversal").
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suggest that she should seek an alternative approach that would undo
the inequality without undermining her own presentation. Initially, she
may attempt a simple solution: encourage defense counsel to shore up
his performance or, if he can no longer repair past mistakes, to withdraw from the trial.
If defense counsel refuses or is incapable of effectuating a remedy
on his own, the prosecutor must take a stronger step. The action that
best furthers the duty to ensure adversarial equality is to report counsel's inadequate performance to the trial court, either by motion to disqualify counsel or simply by telling the judge."' Like most private
attorneys, prosecutors will hesitate to point fingers at other members of
the guild. 116 That hesitation, however, does not detract from the remedy's appropriateness. Indeed, professional codes universally rely on
lawyers to police each other, despite the reality that lawyers view and
apply most reporting obligations with distaste." Interpreting the "do
justice" provision as requiring prosecutors to watchdog defenge counsel
is consistent with both the spirit of modern professional regulation and
the prosecutor's dual role.'
115. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (prosecutors have standing to raise the
issue of defense counsel's competency in order to preserve the administration of criminal justice);
see also M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADvERsARY SYSTEM 88-89 (1975) (arguing that the
prosecutor must advise the trial court of defense counsel's ineffectiveness); Freedman, supra note
38, at 1039-41 (same).
116. See Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not
Enough, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 657, 665 (1989) ("Lawyers not only find reporting a peer for misconduct
distasteful, but characterize those who report as somehow traitorous to their profession"). The
likelihood that the prosecutor will need to deal with counsel in the future creates an additional
disincentive to reporting.
117. Indeed, prosecutorial failure to report ineffective defense representation to the Bar in
some cases already may violate the modem codes. See CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-103(A) (requiring
prosecutors to report ineffectiveness rising to the level of ethical misconduct or reflecting unfitness
to practice law).
118. A duty to highlight substandard defense performance can lend itself to tactical abuse.
See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 166, 170-72 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (prosecutor moved to disqualify the defendant's counsel for conflict of interest under circumstances in which the government itself may have manufactured the conflict).
Motions to disqualify opposing counsel on ethical grounds have become common in civil litigation. As Judge Gurfein noted in J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975):
"[Tihe attempt by an opposing party to disqualify the other side's lawyer must be viewed as a part
of the tactics of an adversary proceeding. As such it demands judicial scrutiny to prevent literalism
[in applying ethical rules] from possibly overcoming substantial justice to the parties." Id. at 1360
(Gurfein, J., concurring).
Judges are aware of the potential tactical benefits of motions to disqualify and can discount
those motions appropriately, as they have done in the civil context. See, e.g., Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming trial court's refusal to disqualify counsel named
as witness by opponent); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. United Health Clubs, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 138,
140 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (requiring "clear-showing" of the need for disqualification); Rice v. Baron, 456
F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that disqualification motions are subject to "particularly strict judicial scrutiny" because they are prone to tactical abuse); Freeman v. Kulicke & Soffa
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It is important to remember that the duty considered thus far
stems from an ethical rather than a constitutional mandate. Courts will
not reverse a conviction based simply on an individual prosecutor's failure to satisfy the codes. Yet to the extent that some prosecutors take
their professional obligation seriously, a practice of reporting inadequate performance would have beneficial effects for defendants. Most
significantly, it would soften the impact of legal rules requiring defendants to raise ineffective assistance objections at the trial level.119 By
highlighting defense counsel's failures, a prosecutor who "reports"
brings potential problems to a defendant's attention. 12 0 Similarly, reporting alerts trial judges to hidden ineffectiveness at a time when the
judges can remedy the deficiency efficiently..2 1 If circumstances war-

rant, a judge can replace an incompetent lawyer, provide additional resources, or order counsel to take steps that would improve his
performance.
Even when the deficiency is patent, as in the example of the
nonperforming counsel, action by the prosecutor prevents the judge
from ignoring the inadequate performance. Informed of the prosecutor's
observations, a judge typically would have to hold a hearing on the effectiveness issue.1 22 The hearing alone will improve the adversarial balance by creating a record for appeal (presumably by different,
competent counsel). Concomitantly, a trial judge's failure to hold a
Indus., 449 F. Supp. 974, 977-78 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (imposing burden on the party moving to disqualify to show that disqualification is necessary). Moreover, prosecuting attorneys have incentives not
to abuse the disqualification remedy. Because they appear before the same judges on a regular
basis, any pattern of improper reporting can cost them hard-earned goodwill. Cf. Wheat, 486 U.S.
at 163 (Court defers to trial court supervision of motions to disqualify).
119. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (imposing on defendants who have
not objected to multiple representation at trial the additional requirement of showing an "adverse
effect").
120. In theory, a prosecutor's failure to report an ineffective opponent alone might constitute
grounds for reversal. If defense counsel's performance truly undermined adversarial fact-finding,
the defendant arguably was denied due process. The Supreme Court, however, implicitly has rejected this argument by establishing independent standards for reversing convictions on ineffectiveness grounds. A breach of ethical rules by itself does not establish a due process violation.
Additional elements, such as "actual prejudice," are essential to fifth and sixth amendment claims.
See supra notes 7, 13 and accompanying text. By the same token, because ethical codes govern
prosecutorial behavior even before the verdict stage, the constitutional elements do not set the
standards for ethical prosecutorial conduct.
121. The Supreme Court has focused on defendants' objections (or failures to object) to create incentives to bring matters to the attention of trial courts and thus to enable the courts to
correct potential errors. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 ("trial courts necessarily rely. . . upon the
good faith and good judgment of defense counsel" to raise problems). Trial courts, nonetheless,
must question improprieties when they know or "reasonably should know" of them. Id. A
prosecutorial reporting requirement often would obviate the need for a speculative appellate inquiry into what the trial court should have known.
122. In a case involving a claim of ineffectiveness, a court may see fit to appoint special
counsel ad litem to litigate the issue on the defendant's behalf.
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hearing after being put on notice eases the defendant's ability to obtain
appellate review of counsel's performance.12 s
As a practical matter, it may be unrealistic for code drafters to expect prosecutors to highlight instances of unequal adversariness. 124 Yet
reporting lax opposition is the remedy most consistent with the codes'
vision of prosecutorial ethics. The prosecutor who reports adopts only a
limited nonadversarial role: she raises an objection for the defendant
when the system cannot rely on defense counsel. She thereby exposes
the adversarial imbalance to trial and appellate review and allows the
defendant's rights, if any, to be vindicated. The prosecutor then can
revert to an advocate's posture, without having abandoned advocacy on
any issue related to the merits.
2. Unequal Resources
a. General Considerations
Ordinarily, adversaries need not help opponents prepare for trial.12 5
With few exceptions, state law does not force prosecutors to assist the
defense, suggest lines of investigation, or provide work product. 2 6 Due
123. Compare Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) (trial court must investigate
timely objection to multiple representation) with Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47 (absent objection,
appellate court ordinarily will not disturb trial judge's decision not to interfere with multiple
representation).
124. See generally Olsson, supra note 116, at 657 (noting the ineffectiveness of reporting
requirements throughout the codes and encouraging better use and enforcement of those
requirements).
125. This section considers prosecutorial conduct in the course of investigation and discovery
because it often overlaps the trial. Most litigators consider information gathering and trial practice
to be inexorably intertwined. What the lawyer knows and what he hopes to find out determine his
tactics and the resulting verdicts.
126. See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 209-14, 98 A.2d 881, 884-86 (1953) (explaining reasons
for limited criminal discovery). See generally Y. KAMIsAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 98,
at 1114-26 (discussing current state of criminal discovery); W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAFL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(a), at 725-30 & nn.4-7 (abr. ed. 1985) (discussing debate over criminal discovery);
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279
(advocating greater criminal discovery). A discussion of the criminal discovery that states should
require is beyond this Article's scope. I accept as a given that states have limited mandatory disclosure and that courts impose some duty to provide exculpatory information. This Article considers only what additional information prosecutors should disclose voluntarily because of the "do
justice" obligation.
Most states have specific rules requiring routine disclosure by prosecutors. Largely because of
limitations on reciprocal discovery, the rules generally are narrow in scope. See, e.g., State v.
Hughes, 104 Ariz. 535, 538, 456 P.2d 393, 396 (1969) (finding no duty to point out evidence
favorable to the defendant); Bryant v. State, 268 Ind. 498, 499-500, 376 N.E.2d 1123, 1124-25
(1978) (upholding refusal to perform paraffin test sought by defense); State v. Urrego, 41 Ohio
App. 2d 124, 126, 322 N.E.2d 688, 689 (Ct. App. 1974) (the state "need not gather evidence for the
accused"). Prosecutors who disclose too much risk creating an imbalance in resources in favor of
the defense. See, e.g., D. LuBAN, supra note 29, at 51 (discussing how the adversary system "explains why ruthless behavior [by counsel] is considered acceptable or even necessary"); Adlerstein,
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process decisions require prosecutors to give defendants information
only if it is exculpatory, 2 7 material,' 28 and requested by the defense. 129

Prosecutors have no constitutional obligation to obtain evidence on the
defense's behalf.'30 Nevertheless, the codes' adversarial justice standard
requires prosecutors to consider whether they sport a resource advantage that creates an imbalance or prevents a fair adversarial joust.13 '
supra note 11, at 758 ("The execution of [the prosecutor's duty to convict the guilty] may be
thwarted by defendants who, if given too much information[,]... can suborn perjury or endanger
and intimidate witnesses, as well as fabricate evidence").
127. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring disclosure upon request of
"evidence favorable to [the] accused"); see also Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1004, 1006 (1986). The constitutional disclosure obligation flows from the notion that disclosure of exculpatory information is the best method for
assuring that the prosecution does not secure convictions through the use of false evidence. See
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. The definition of "materiality" has spawned much litigation. The Supreme Court has
concluded that even impeachment evidence may be material. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154-55 (1972). Generally, though, the Court has applied a flexible standard that depends on the
specificity of defense counsel's request for information. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
103-04 (1976); see also Babcock, supra note 44, at 1143. After a prosecutor's refusal to disclose, the
issue on appeal seems to have become whether the defense can show "a reasonable possibility that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion); see
also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (noting that Bagley established new standards
for the materiality determination).
129. When the defense fails to make a specific request for exculpatory materials or requests
only generally "all Brady material," courts rarely find that a failure to disclose violates due process. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
130. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (good faith failure to preserve
medical samples for defense testing does not violate due process); California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479 (1984) (government has little or no duty to preserve evidence for possible use by defense).
A few courts have imposed limited constitutional obligations on prosecutors to cooperate with the
defense. See, e.g., Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 625, 522 P.2d 681, 686-87, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 126 (1974) (defense entitled to lineup). Some jurisdictions require prosecutors to let the
defense conduct scientific tests of physical evidence in the prosecution's hands. See Y. KAISAR, W.
LAFAvII & J. ISRAEL, supra note 98, at 1162 and cases cited therein; Oparil, Making the Defendant's Case: How Much Assistance Must the ProsecutorProvide?,23 Am. CEnM L. REv. 447, 459-69
(1986) and cases cited therein. But most discovery statutes only require prosecutors to disclose
information in their immediate possession or control. See Y. KAIAISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAFL,
supra note 98, at 1117-18 (discussing scope of "control").
A small minority of jurisdictions have adopted rules that require prosecutors to call to the
stand witnesses who have evidence favorable to the accused. See Note, Duty of the Prosecutor to
Call Witnesses Whose Testimony Will Help the Accused to EstablishHis Innocence, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 68 and authorities cited therein; see also Oparil, supra, at 473-80 (discussing arguments in
favor of prosecutorial "duty to assist the defendant"). These rules for the most part are historical
anomalies, see Note, supra, at 71-73, and run counter to the ordinary conception of adversarial
prosecutions.
131. Some model codes explicitly require prosecutors to disclose liberally. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING To THE ADMINIsTRATIoN OF JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.11 (1979) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS]. But generally these either have not been adopted or depend on mutual discovery that
may violate defendants' right against self-incrimination. See, e.g, NATIONAL DisTRicT ATroRNEYS
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standards 13.1-13.5 (1977) [hereinafter NDAA
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Prosecutors' offices rarely have manpower advantages that would
undermine adversarial equality.132 But they do have material resources
unavailable to the defense. The ability to employ police as investigators, use grand jury subpoena power to force cooperation of v'itnesses,
time indictments, consult the government's vast forensic services and
computer records, and appeal to jurors' natural fear of crime all contribute to prosecutorial effectiveness. One former United States Attorney General has stated: "I know of no prosecutor who thinks that, in
this balance [of resources relating to]. the advocate's art, [s]he is the
loser."1 3
Were it true that prosecutors routinely have overwhelming advantages, one would have to question the viability of the adversary system
as a means for adjudicating criminal cases.134 The system, however,
builds in countervailing advantages for the defense. The presumption of
innocence, the reasonable doubt standard, the defendant's right to remain silent, and the ability to demand exculpatory evidence from the
13 5
government, to name a few, help maintain a fair adjudicative balance.
(imposing similar discovery obligations upon prosecution and defense, including disclosure of the defendant's statements); cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970) (upholding some reciprocal discovery requirements). But see MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8
comment (noting that individual jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards). See generally
Nakell, CriminalDiscovery for the Defense and the Prosecution: The Developing Constitutional
Considerations,50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972) (discussing limits of acceptable discovery requirements
against the defense); Van Kessel, ProsecutorialDiscovery and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination:Accommodation or Capitulation,4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 855 (1977) (same); Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His
Defense, 66 CALn. L. REV. 935 (1978). In deciding whether and how to disclose, a prosecutor must
consider factors other than the defendant's need for information. See, e.g., United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that because no discovery'system could assure total
access to the government's case without risking danger to witnesses and suborning of perjury,
"there must be some ultimate reliance on the ethics of the prosecutor"). To protect witnesses and
the integrity of the prosecution, the prosecutor may call on court intervention or seek restrictions
on the use of discovered materials.
132. Unlike large civil litigation firms that "paper-to-death" undermanned opponents, a
prosecutor's office that assigns multiple lawyers to a single case also assigns them other responsibilities. Cf. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, "....
IN THE SPIRIT oF PUBLIC SERVIcE:" A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALIsM 3 (1986) (discussing the "'scorched
earth' strategy of [civil] litigation"); Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems?,67 ABA
J. 450-52 (1981); Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 1, 21-22
(1982).
133. Civiletti, supra note 64, at 20.
134. Indeed, Murray Schwartz suggests that the "manifest inequality in resources between
the average defendant and the state [have] necessitat[ed] a drastic change of the structural rules
to assure that there is some constraint on the ability of the prosecution to work its will without
significant challenge." Schwartz, supra note 25, at 549. He thus concludes that the essential postulates regarding equality in the adversary system do not apply to criminal trials. Id. at 550; see also
infra note 274.
135. Most of defendants' constitutional privileges hinder, rather than enhance, the search for
truth. David Luban states, "We want to handicap the state in its power even legitimately to punish
STANDARDS]
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In interpreting prosecutors' duty to "do justice" under the ethical
codes, it therefore is not enough to note that prosecutors have special
resources. Indeed, without them the prosecutors themselves might be
unable to compete as equals. In insisting that parties be roughly
equivalent, the adversarial system intends that each side have access to
key information and the means to find it. How the parties focus their
respective time and resources before and during trials is a tactical
choice that the theory of adversarial justice leaves to counsel."'
We already have noted that an imbalance in resources can undermine a criminal defense lawyer's ability to perform.1 3 7 For example, if
counsel cannot devote adequate time to the defense-either because of
an overwhelming case load or the timing of the indictment 13 5-his theoretical ability to prepare for trial becomes meaningless. Under these
constraints, even a good lawyer may render poor or ineffective assistance. The prosecutor faces the same quandary and has the same responses that are available in the "unequal adversary" context.1 39
Inequality of resources can impede the system's ability to produce
valid results in other ways. The fear that the government will develop
an informational monopoly is one reason why code drafters impose an
occasional duty on prosecutors to step out of the competitive role.140
The government's exercise of its unique ability to investigate and conscript witnesses and information itself can deprive the defense of adequate access to information. 4 ' When the government's use of resources
us. And so' the adversary system is justified, not because it is a good way of achieving justice, but
because it is a good way of hobbling the government. . . ." Luban, supra note 41, at 92; see also
Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1139-40
(1988) (discussing reasons for constitutional and evidentiary obstacles to truth-seeking).
136. A few courts have sanctioned a prosecutor's good faith failure to disclose exculpatory
information on the grounds that defense counsel may not have been diligent in discovering the
evidence and that the defendant "should not suffer for the mistakes of his counsel." United States
v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1967). But see Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp 218, 220-21 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (failure to disclose psychiatrist's report recommending competency hearing failed to
satisfy due process). But absent extreme circumstances involving a risk of prosecution based on
false evidence, see Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967), courts ordinarily have not questioned counsel's tactical decisions.
137. See supra notes 75, 87 and accompanying text.
138. Prosecutors can impose one-sided time constraints by conducting their own lengthy investigation at the grand jury stage and then using "speedy trial" arguments to oppose postindictment delay.
139. See Babcock, supra note 44, at 1142 (contending that the less the system requires prosecutors to disclose, the more carefully it must assure adequate defense counsel).
140. See infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text.
141. See Simon v. Gray, 356 F. Supp 265, 270 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (finding prosecutorial disclosure necessary to offset "the imbalance in resources"); cf. United States v. Miranne, 688 F.2d 980,
987 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that due process disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), are "based upon a realization of the vast resources of the prosecutor"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1109 (1983).
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impedes the defense's ability to obtain evidence or significantly increases the investigative effort that the defense must undertake, it
crosses the line from balancing the contest to making it unfairly onesided.142
For example, through their institutional involvement with undercover investigators and informants, prosecutors effortlessly learn relevant details about police conduct or misconduct. 143 In contrast, defense

counsel often have no reason to suspect such details exist. Absent a
prosecutorial duty to disclose, the defense must investigate in the dark
simply to keep up with the prosecution-wasting limited resources in
the process. The undesirable alternative is to forego all investigation on
the subject.
Similarly, the defense usually does not have the means to match
police searches for evidence."' Even if defense counsel could send out
an equivalent investigative team, the government's own search probably
would undermine the defendant's: witnesses initially approached by the
state typically become willing to cooperate with the prosecution but not
with the defense.143
By the same token, the prosecution routinely employs forensic services that defendants cannot reproduce. This occurs either because the
defendants cannot afford competitive experts or, as in the case of FBI
laboratories, because the government has a virtual monopoly on the expert service in question.'4" Even competent, well-intentioned defense
lawyers may be deprived of access to information or may find themselves overwhelmed by the standard of investigation and preparation
142. Similar issues may arise in a prosecutor's exercise of pretrial power, such as seizure of
the defendant's assets. While the ostensible reason for the action may be to protect the government's interest in the defendant's property, it can have the side effect of undermining the defense.
See generally Cloud, ForfeitingDefense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an InstitutionalRole Theory
to Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1; Note, Drug Proceeds Forfeiture
and the Right to Counsel of Choice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1377 (1990).
143. Police misconduct may justify suppression of evidence even if the underlying facts are
not exculpatory Brady information. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
144. Police investigations, for example, may depend on a door-to-door search for witnesses.
Resources available for defense investigation rarely permit such an elaborate effort to obtain even
critical evidence.
145. The reasons may include the witness's identification with the prosecution, dislike for a
person the government has targeted as a defendant, fear of all criminals, and prosecutorial or
police suggestions that the witness should not cooperate. Unlike the prosecution, which can overcome witness reluctance through its grand jury subpoena power, defense counsel have no means of
forcing noncooperative witnesses to share information.
146. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 724-26, 352 S.E.2d 762, 774-75 (court denies defense access to full neurological examination requested by defense psychiatrist despite the prosecution's reliance on its own partial neurological examination), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). But
cf. People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Colo. 1983) (court upholds
the defendant's right to demand particular method of trace metal testing).
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that the prosecution sets.
b. Applications of the "'DoJustice" Rule
Let us analyze how the requirement of adversarial justice works in
some common unequal resource scenarios." 7 Consider a case involving
access to information:
The arresting officers tell the district attorney that they observed the defendant engage in a drug transaction after their supervisor had directed them to patrol
the general area in which it occurred. Such an assignment was routine for them.
The prosecutor later discovers that other officers had illegally wiretapped a codefendant's telephone, learned when and where the transaction would occur, and told
the supervisor. The arresting officers were unaware of this information.
The prosecutor concludes that if the defense files the appropriate motion to
suppress, the court probably, but not certainly, would suppress all the information
about the transaction. 148 But defense counsel has no reason to suspect the wiretap
and files no motion.

Even without mandatory discovery rules, 149 the district attorney

might feel constrained to disclose the wiretap information, to avoid relying on the fruits of the illegal surveillance, or to dismiss the case. 150
147. In each scenario, we may assume that the prosecuting attorney believes in the defendant's guilt. Accordingly, absent the professional codes' mandate, a prosecutor could justify winning
at all cost.
148. Depending on the circumstances surrounding the wiretap's installation, the government
might be able to take advantage of the expanding good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) (good faith reliance on warrant justifies illegal
search). If the illegality stems from a failure to follow regulatory procedures, rather than a constitutional violation, the fruits may not be suppressible. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741,
755-57 (1979) (fruits of illegal IRS surveillance not suppressed). The defendant may have standing
only to challenge a wiretap of his own phone or, at a minimum, his own conversations. See Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (rejecting standing for persons without "legitimate expectation
of privacy" in invaded area); cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality-opinion) (defendant has no reasonable expectation that other party to conversation will not record or
transmit conversation to other listeners).
149. For purposes of this analysis, let us take as a given that the applicable procedural discovery rules do not require disclosure of the wiretap and that the police witnesses will not cooperate voluntarily with the defense. Local rules often require disclosure of wiretaps, but only if the
government intends to introduce the contents of the taped conversations into evidence. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRI. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (mandating disclosure of tangible objects "intended for use... as
evidence"); cf. United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 312 (2d Cir.) (treating tape recordings as
covered by Rule 16), cert. denied sub nom. Giuppone v. United States, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); see
also FED.R. CraM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (objects must be disclosed if "material to the preparation of [the]
defense"). Due process considerations probably would not require disclosure of the wiretap because its content is not "exculpatory" (i.e., it does not suggest the defendant is innocent), and
because defense counsel made no request for the information. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

150. Such an intuition formed the bases for several recent episodes of the television program
L.A. Law, in which the prosecutor, Grace Van Owen, was guilt-stricken by her failure to disclose
that a witness who had overheard a jailed defendant confess was a government informant. Prose-

cutor Van Owen, however, may have had a higher disclosure obligation than our hypothetical attorney because the confession was more clearly excludable and because she relied directly on the
evidence illegally seized.
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Yet the model codes do not 'include any express ethical directive to do
so. Because the information does not tend to negate the defendant's
guilt, the codes do not require disclosure.' 8 ' In relying on the arresting
officers' observations, the district attorney will not use false information' 5 nor perpetrate a fraud upon the court. 53 Only the "do justice"
rule is relevant to the prosecutor's ethical decision of whether she
should remain silent, disclose, or take more drastic steps.
Referring to the adversary system's premises helps the prosecutor
identify what the codes' justice requires. If she hides the wiretap information, the defendant still has a full opportunity to present evidence
and be judged according to an impartial, structured forensic process.
The defendant remains represented by active and presumably competent defense counsel. Yet viewing the situation fairly, the prosecutor
54
probably must recognize that counsel lacks access to key information;
the information is uniquely in the government's possession and counsel
has no reason to believe it exists. The prosecutor who endeavors to
achieve adversarial justice should conclude that defense resources do
not even roughly match her own. The premise of rough equality of advocacy fails.
This reasoning also would determine the remedy. The hypothetical
district attorney's obligation is simply to rectify the imbalance in resources-the failure of the adversarial process. Because she still can
support the admissibility of the arresting officers' testimony, there is no
reason to forfeit the evidence voluntarily. Nor do adversarial principles
require dismissal of the charges. The police department's misconduct in
installing and hiding an illegal wiretap may justify administrative or
judicial sanctions, but once in the open, does not bear on the adversarial search for truth. 55 Informing the defense of the wiretap suffices
151. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8(d); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-103(B) (both
mandating disclosure of information that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant).
152. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(b).
153. See id. Rule 1.2(d); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A).
154. See generally supra note 136 and accompanying text.
155. Change the hypothetical slightly:
Assume that the buyer of the drugs was a police informant. The District Attorney is confident

that the informant would have alerted the police of the transaction had the police not already
known.
Here, the District Attorney is on firmer ground in believing that his evidence is admissible.
Arguably, the illegally seized information would have been "inevitably discovered." See Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (adopting the "inevitable discovery" rule). If the buyer already had begun the process of informing the police, the information may have had an "independent source."' See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (describing
the "independent source" rule). Yet the ethical analysis remains the same. The key is neither
whether the defendant is guilty nor whether the prosecutor's arguments will win. The role-differentiated prosecutor must look beyond results, beyond achieving correct verdicts, to assure that the

adversarial joust is fair. She still must disclose the information.
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to rectify the system's fault.15 6
Similar but less conclusive reasoning applies when the government's investigative resource advantage comes to the fore. For example,
may prosecutors exercise control over key witnesses? As a constitutional matter, most jurisdictions forbid directly instructing witnesses
not to cooperate with the defense. 15 7 But there is no clear rule forbidding a prosecutor to advise a witness truthfully of the negative consequences of cooperating s or to request that the witness allow the
prosecutor to be present at interviews. "
The prosecutor who looks to the ethical codes' express terms again
finds little guidance: the prosecutor need disclose only information
"known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt" 6 and avoid "unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party's access to evidence." 6 1 Under the
156. Consider the next step: The hypothetical District Attorney discloses the existence of the
wiretap, but defense counsel neither requests details nor files a motion to suppress. At this point,
the prosecutor's analysis of her obligations should change focus. The problem of unequal resources
has been solved. But another potential failure of the process may be evident: defense counsel's
failure actively to pursue suppression of key evidence may rise to the level of inadequate
representation.
The prosecutor has an obligation to consider possible tactical explanations for counsel's conduct, perhaps to discuss the matter with him, and ultimately to consider reporting counsel's errors
to the court. Again, however, the remedy must fit the reasons that trigger the prosecutor's ethical
obligations. The prosecutor's duty is not to assure the defendant's victory, but merely to preserve
the boundaries for an adversarial joust.
157. See, e.g., IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-44 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (reversing
trial judge's instruction to witnesses that they speak to defense counsel only with a stenographer
present); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing conviction on
due process grounds for prosecutor's instruction to witnesses not to speak with the defense); State
v. York, 291 Or. 535, 539-43, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263-65 (1981) (relying on DR 7-103(B) to conclude
that the prosecutor may not "order or advise a witness not to speak to the defense attorneys");
Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas, 436 Pa. 296, 303, 260 A.2d 184, 188 (1969) (advice not to talk
held improper). A few jurisdictions statutorily prohibit such conduct. See People v. Peter, 55 IMI.
2d 443, 450-51, 303 N.E.2d 398, 403-04 (1973) (discussing Illinois rule), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974).
158. Compare United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrak, 408 F. Supp. 476, 481-82 (D.N.J.
1976) (emphasizing that a witness's right to refuse cooperation is not equivalent to instruction to
remain silent), aff'd, 563 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978) with York, 291
Or. at 541, 632 P.2d at 1264 (holding it improper to advise witnesses of consequences and that "it
would be better if they didn't say anything").
159. See, e.g., State v. Reichenberger, 182 N.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Minn. 1970) (approving this
procedure on the limited facts of the case).
160. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.8(d) (emphasis added); accord CODE, supra note 1,
DR 7-103(B).
161. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(a) (emphasis added); see also CODE, supra note 1,
DR 7-109(B) (forbidding only advising a witness to hide or leave the jurisdiction).
The ABA Standardsrelating to the prosecution function suggest that obstructing communication between the defense and witnesses is "unprofessional conduct." ABA STANDARDS, supra note
131, Standard 3-3.1(c). The Standards, however, do not suggest a rationale for this prosecutorial
obligation, and, indeed, impose the same duties upon the defense. Id. Standard 4-4.3(c). The ABA
explicitly declined to incorporate the standards into the subsequent Model Rules. See J.DOUGLASS,
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adversarial approach to the "do justice" rule, however, the prosecutor
must consider also whether hindering witness cooperation in a lawful,
truthful manner is consistent with adversarial truthseeking. The answer
to that question varies with different situations.
Suppose, first, that a witness is the sole observer of a crime and
that defense counsel either does not know of the witness's existence or
cannot identify him. Under constitutional standards, the prosecutor
need not mention the witness unless the witness's information is exculpatory.'62 As a matter of adversarial justice, however, the prosecutor
cannot reasonably conclude that the defense has equal access to infor63
1
mation or that the joust can be fair.

Now suppose that defense counsel knows the witness's identity.
The witness asks the prosecutor what he should do when the defense
seeks an interview. If the witness is subject to the prosecution's control,
advice not to cooperate with the defense cuts off defense counsel's opportunity to get information.6 To avoid creating an imbalance in the
parties' access to facts, the prosecutor may need to forbear pressing the
advantage. 165
supra note 6, at 64 (noting that the ABA Standards were "readily available" to the Kutak Committee, but that "very little from the standards are included in the Model Rules").
162. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
163. Cf. Wainwright v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1968) (granting habeas corpus on
due process grounds for prosecution's failure to disclose a statement made by the sole eye-witness
and noting the prosecution's "special access to [the] witness[]").
164. In the case of experienced witnesses, advice may not even be necessary. Police, for example, may adopt a policy of noncooperation that can be overcome only if the prosecutor takes
affirmative steps to neutralize the policy. See United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1975); United States v.
King, 368 F. Supp. 130, 131 (M.D. Fla. 1973). Particularly when police have exclusive information,
the adversarial notion of equal access to information may require the prosecutor to assist the
defense.
165. Consider also a situation in which the prosecution has engaged the services of an expert
witness whom the defense cannot afford to counteract. The judicial position seems to be that due
process entitles defendants only to limited free expert assistance. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 256 Ga.
715, 724-26, 352 S.E.2d 762, 774-75 (denial of neurologist's assistance requested by defense psychiatrist), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 85 (1985) (defendant entitled to psychiatrist's assistance because it is a "basic tool[] of an adequate defense" and
necessary to provide "meaningful access to the judicial process"). A prosecutor who plans to rely
heavily on an expert, knows that the subject matter is open to dispute, and is aware that defense
counsel wants, but cannot afford, expert assistance may have an ethical obligation to rectify the
imbalance. Cf. Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 520-21, 327 P.2d 68, 73-74 (Ct.
App. 1958) (state improperly encouraged pathologist not to cooperate with the defense). Depending on the nature of the dispute, the prosecutor may conclude that a fair adversarial contest requires the state to provide the defense with funds for its own expert. In other situations, assuring
free access to and the cooperation of the state's witness may rectify the imbalance. Compare Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830-31 (Ala. 1973) (defense constitutionally entitled to independent
testing of seized narcotics) with People v. Bell, 74 Mich. App. 270, 275, 253 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Ct.
App. 1977) (opportunity to cross-examine prosecution's scientist satisfies due process).
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If we amend the hypothetical to consider the truly neutral witness,
the prosecutor's role in doing justice becomes more problematic. She
may not create obstacles to the defense investigation by volunteering
advice that cooperation would be foolish. Yet as the lawyer for the
state, she may have to respond to the witness's request for advice.1 66 On
the one hand, a prosecutor's neutral explanation that a witness's statements are assailable in cross-examination-just as previous statements
to the prosecution are subject to attack-does not seem to upset the
adversarial balance.1 6 7 On the other hand, an explanation phrased to
deter cooperation indeed may undermine the defense's ability to use its
own investigative resources.10 8
Finally, suppose that there are many witnesses to the crime, some
cooperating with the prosecution and others with the defense. The
prosecutor justifiably may conclude that the defense has access to the
information necessary to prepare an adequate defense. 69 Advising a
prosecution witness of the drawbacks of speaking with defense counsel
may result in some surprises for the defense at trial. Yet the level of
uncertainty society approves of in the trial process is more a question of
procedural discovery rules than ethics; surprise alone does not under17 0
mine the premises of adversarial justice.
This analysis distills the core considerations the codes require the
prosecutor to take into account in assessing trial resources. A prosecutor need not undertake defense counsel's job of gathering ammunition.
But her responsibility to the codes' vision of justice sometimes requires
her to provide information or forensic services that discovery rules
would not guarantee.17 1 When defense counsel seeks key assistance that
is otherwise unobtainable, the prosecutor owes it to the system to facili166. See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 40 Wis. 2d 398, 402-03, 162 N.W.2d 48, 50 (1968) (prosecutor's accurate response to witness's inquiry cannot be basis for reversal).
167. Cf., e.g., United States v. Nardi, 633 F.2d 972, 977 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that neutrally
imparted information regarding witness's options does not violate due process); United States v.
White, 454 F.2d 435, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. King, 368 F. Supp. 130, 131
(M.D. Fla. 1973) (same).
168. See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasizing the prosecutor's duty of "strict neutrality" in advising witnesses).
169. Cf., e.g., State v. McLain, 125 N.W.2d 764, 769-70 (Iowa 1964) (failure of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory physical test is not unfair because defense was aware of other reports
and witnesses who would testify to the same facts).
170. Drafters of discovery rules or professional codes, for independent reasons, could promulgate disclosure requirements designed to eliminate surprise. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. My point is simply that the possibility of unexpected testimony, by itself, does not
violate the adversary system or an adversarially oriented ethical provision.
171. See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting a "weakness in the
adversary system . . . arising (sometimes) from the prosecution's superior resources and special
access to information and witnesses").
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tate a complete trial record. 172 Similarly, she must share key information that defense counsel has no reason to believe exists.173 The
adversarial interpretation of "justice" underscores the notion that when
competent defense attorneys lack the tools to offer a vigorous case, deof information that
spite their best efforts, the tribunal is deprived
17 4
should- be available in a competitive process.
The examples also illustrate why code drafters committed to competitive fact-finding would tolerate prosecutorial assistance even though
it may enhance a defendant's case. The prosecutor who equalizes resources-like the prosecutor who highlights ineffective defense representation 17 5 -remains competitive. She still forcefully advocates the
government's case. The codes' ideal looks only to whether both adversaries present their own evidence and contest the opponent's evidence in
an aggressive way.
Nonetheless, this discussion again highlights the grey areas inevitable in a generalized justice approach to ethics. A government lawyer
clearly need not disclose all information in her possession nor honor all
defense demands for assistance. Under the adversarial model, if defense
counsel has alternative means to obtain particular information or develop particular trial resources, he ordinarily is left to his own devices.
But a prosecutor often will find it difficult to determine whether reasonable alternatives exist. A defendant's failure to seek key information
may stem from defense counsel's incompetence, his inability to imagine
172. In assessing her obligation, the prosecutor must keep in mind the difference between
disclosing initially and reversing a conviction for failure to disclose. Most of the standards set by
case law arise from the latter context. An appellate court may hesitate to reverse and thereby
cause a ietrial or acquittal, even though the court may believe that disclosure would have been the
better avenue. An ethical prosecutor, in deciding whether to disclose, must focus on whether adversarial equality mandates disclosure, rather than whether no'disclosure would result in reversal.
173. Because of the Supreme Court's emphasis on defense counsel's request for relevant discovery, questions of ineffective representation often merge with disclosure issues. In Evans v.
Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966), for example, the court granted habeas corpus relief on
two separate grounds: The prosecutor's failure to disclose fully a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, and defense counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to pursue the information that was disclosed. Id. at 222; see also Babcock, supra note 44, at 1167 (suggesting that current weak standards
of effectiveness combined with limitations on discovery undermine adversary system).
174. This framework similarly aids the prosecutor in deciding how she may act, when she
does act. May the prosecutor, for example, suggest to a witness that she speak with the defense
counsel only in the prosecutor's presence? The answer probably should be a negative, for such an
interview may require defense counsel to avoid questions that would divulge strategy. In an adversarial world, this scenario may provide the prosecution with a nonreciprocal advantage that would
undermine the contest. On the other hand, adversarial justice does not give defense counsel license
to trick or intimidate witnesses. A prosecutor legitimately may suggest to a witness that the witness tape the interview or ask a chaperone to be present in the event he later wishes to dispute
what occurred. In the case of a witness who is afraid, the prosecutor may seek protections to keep
the witness's identity from the defendant, while allowing counsel access.
175. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
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that the information exists, or his strategic choice not to waste time and
effort. Similarly, a defendant's demand for tangible assistance from the
prosecution may represent a tactical effort to create an appellate record, a desire to avoid spending defense resources, or a bona fide inability to match the prosecution's own level of preparation. Directing
prosecutors who must distinguish these situations to a flexible reference
point like "equal adversariness" provides limited guidance-far less
than would rules specifying when prosecutors must supplement defense
resources. The adversarial framework supplies only one small piece of
the puzzle: an ethical obligation arises at the point assistance becomes
necessary for the system to follow its adversarial design.
B. Failure of the Process Itself
1. Biased and Overactive Tribunals
A major element of adversarial justice is the opportunity of both
parties to present evidence and persuade a neutral, passive decision
maker. 176 Ordinarily, flaws in the decision-making process are self-correcting. A judge who forecloses an advocate's presentation, interferes
too actively in the proceedings, or acts in a biased manner is subject to
appellate review. The injured party's trial advocate is in a position to
object and make a sound record for appeal. 1 77 Prosecutors exposed to
the same judicial conduct as defense counsel typically have no duty to
act because counsel can maintain the adversarial balance on his own.
Yet occasions arise in which a defense lawyer does not cure defects
in the process. He may be unaware of the fact finder's bias or inappropriate action. In other situations, defense counsel may feel so intimidated that he fails in his obligation to challenge the proceedings.
Though the first scenario presents prosecutors with a distasteful
task, it poses few ethical quandaries. The professional codes already
state that prosecutors, like all lawyers, must report judicial or juror
bias 7 8 or out-of-court activities (for example, ex parte communica176. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
177. Indeed, the reporters abound with appellate claims of judicial misconduct. See, e.g.,
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) (improper comments by trial judge); United States v.
Harding, 335 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685 (9th Cir.
1937) (frequent interruptions creating impression of bias).
178. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, Rule 8.3(b) ("A lawyer having knowledge that a
judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct ... shall inform the appropriate authority"); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (1972) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CODE] (forbidding judges to allow relationships to influence judicial conduct); see also Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 449 Pa. 50, 295 A.2d 303 (1972) (Roberts, J., concurring) (prosecutor required to disclose
juror's relationship to victim); cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216-17 (1982) (requiring showing
of actual bias for reversal on appeal from prosecutor's failure to disclose possible juror bias); CODE,
supra note 1, DR 1-103(B) (requiring lawyers to disclose judicial misconduct upon request of au-
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tions). l 9 If the prosecutor's daily interaction with the court creates an
interpersonal relationship that predisposes a judge to favor the prosecutor, the codes require recusal of one or the other.180
What, though, is the prosecutor's responsibility when she knows
that defense counsel is aware of inappropriate judicial behavior, but has
not counteracted it? Judges can persuade or intimidate lawyers into
curtailing their presentations, withdrawing objections, or submitting to
rulings that harm their clients. Some lawyers who challenge judicial
conduct are silenced by threats of contempt. 81 Does "doing justice" require that a prosecutor either intervene or avoid taking advantage of
the judge's behavior?
Judicial intimidation ordinarily becomes part of the record and is
grounds for an appellate court to excuse defense counsel's failure to
raise objections. Yet the appellate remedy does not substitute for
prosecutorial pursuit of justice, because the appellate court focuses on
different considerations than the prosecutor. In assessing a trial judge's
conduct, the appellate court looks first to the likelihood that the defendant would have won the case;' s rarely will the court be able to conclude from a paper record that, overall, judicial intimidation prevented
the defendant from receiving a fair trial. Moreover, an appellate court
probably would consider the intimidation relevant primarily on the narrow issue of whether counsel's failure to raise an objection regarding
particular rulings precludes an appeal of the rulings. 83 Substantive
thorized investigatory tribunal).
179. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.5(b) (forbidding ex parte contacts); CODE,
supra note 1, DR 7-110(B) (same); JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 178, Canon 3(A)(4) (same).
180. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 178, Canon 3(C)(1)(a) (requiring recusal because of
personal bias); cf. Steele, supra note 13, at 973 ("Violations of DR 7-110(B) are a gross affront to
the delicate balances required to maintain the equilibrium of the adversary system"). At a minimum, these potential grounds for bias must be disclosed to the adversary in order to create a
record on the issue of procedural fairness. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 178, Canon 3(D)
(presenting option of consent to continued participation).
To posit that the ethics of the situation are clear is not to say that prosecutors can implement
the duty without difficulty. Most prosecutors develop relationships with judges, but can rationalize
favorable rulings on grounds other than favoritism. The codes, however, clearly call upon both
judge and lawyer to make a judgment about whether the adversarial prerequisite of a neutral and
passive fact finder actually exists. See Steele, supra note 13, at 972 ("Frequently, the assignment
of a prosecutor to one particular judge can lead to a team-member kind of rapport. . . that facilitates violations of DR 7-110").
181. Cf. United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957) ("fortunately...
counsel continued to object" despite the judge's disparagement).
182. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (establishing the "harmless error" doctrine). See generally Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error,59 VA. L. REv. 988, 990 (1973) (discussing problems with the doctrine).
183. See generally C. WRIGHT, 3A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 856
(1982) (discussing the plain error rule); Waltz, supra note 99, at 307 (identifying courts that have
relaxed "orthodox principles of appellate review when confronted by a record made by an ama-
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grounds for reversal still must appear on the record.
At the initial trial level, the adversarial justice interpretation of the
codes requires the ethical prosecutor to consider different issues. Is the
contest actually the type of contest the adversary system envisions? Is
the defendant being judged according to a process that satisfies the basic assumptions of a neutral and passive fact finder? If a prosecutor
cannot answer affirmatively and is not persuaded that appeal will rectify the imbalance, the adversarial justice approach suggests that she
may not proceed passively to convict.
The prosecutor has several courses of action. She could intentionally forfeit evidence to undo the impact of the judge's rulings or vocally
oppose the intimidation. But since the prosecutor will have introduced
the evidence initially (or raised the initial objection to the defendant's
evidence), she probably does not want to give it up. Her limited goal in
intervening is to restore defense counsel's ability to argue his points.
Forfeiting evidence or opposing the judge may not "do justice" to the
state's case.""4
Referring to the adversary system's underlying premises does not
tell the prosecutor what remedial steps to take. Absent a more specific
ethical mandate than to "do justice," she at best can attempt a common
sense reconciliation of the procedural concerns and her role in presenting strong evidence against the accused. Recognizing adversarial imbalance as the source of her duty to act, however, does suggest approaches
for the prosecutor to consider. The prosecutor may be able to rectify
the imbalance by encouraging defense counsel to withstand judicial intimidation. She may be able to reinforce counsel's will by agreeing to
testify on his behalf in any contempt proceeding. Although such interference with defense counsel's performance seems to contradict adversarial principles, it is reconcilable when its sole goal is to reestablish
procedural fairness.
In extreme cases, the adversarial interpretation of "doing justice"
always leaves a prosecutor one drastic option to assure an adversarially
valid trial. With defense counsel's agreement, she can move to withdraw
the charges and reprosecute at a later time, before a different judge. For
reasons of economy, prosecutors naturally will disfavor this remedy.
They also may resist using it for fear of offending the presiding judge.
Yet the remedy can be efficient, particularly in cases in which defense
objections, if made, would lead to appellate reversal and retrial. Before
teur" and have treated claims that "inexperienced counsel mishandled the trial defense" as a vehicle for granting review of asserted errors that were not properly preserved).
184. In other words, exercising these options may undermine the likelihood of meritorious
conviction, draw the court's wrath on the prosecution itself, or produce a prejudicial ruling with
which the prosecutor substantively disagrees.
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intemperate arbiters, reprosecution may be the only way to achieve adversarial justice without undermining the prosecution's ability to make
its case.
2.

Decisions Based on Nonevidentiary Considerations

The most controversial area of prosecutorial ethics concerns methods of persuasion that government attorneys use to convince jurors.
May a prosecutor play upon juror bias? May she raise false inferences
in examining witnesses? How emphatically may a prosecutor sum up
her case? Due process and equal protection principles limit
prosecutorial activity in these contexts, but only haphazardly. 185 Because constitutional standards focus on the effect of prosecutorial conduct on verdicts, they fail to incorporate the professional codes'
procedural concerns.
Adversarial justice presupposes that decision makers will reach
their conclusions based solely on the evidence and arguments that the
parties properly present. Various rules constrain an attorney's ability to
argue facts beyond the record. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility forbids alluding to matter unsupported "by admissible evidence" 186 and forbids asserting "frivolous positions. 1 87 Courts also
enforce due process to remedy arguments that courts determine, after
the fact, have provoked verdicts based on "sympathy"18' 8 or
"prejudice."' 8 9
Although these standards, by their terms, do not differentiate
among lawyers, private attorneys feel only a limited ethical obligation
to prejudge their evidence or curb their rhetoric. Private counsel emphasize their client-centered duties: they must represent their clients
with utmost zeal; 90° they must put forward the best possible claim or
defense.19 ' The law even condones some defense efforts to obtain un185. See infra notes 207,-215, 223-31, 235 and accompanying text.
186. CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-106(C)(1); accord MODEL RULEs, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(e).
187. CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-4; accord MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.1.
188. Typical appeals to sympathy emphasize the loss suffered by a victim's family. See, e.g.,
Lime v. State, 479 P.2d 608, 609 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 368
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Limited references of this nature may be permissible under this Article's
model. See infra note 241.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239-40 (1940) (appeal
to class prejudice improper); United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1980) (references
to defendant's wealth improper); Joyner v. State, 436 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)
(appeal to racial prejudice during period following local race riots improper).
190. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-101; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.3
comment ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf").
191. See CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-101(A)(3) (lawyer may not "[p]rejudice or damage his
client"); cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.3 comment (1) (lawyer is not bound to press every
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supported verdicts, through jury nullification of the facts or law.192 Judicial oversight of the presentation, rather than lawyer self-restraint,
provides the remedy for defense attempts to encourage decisions based
on nonrecord considerations.
When a prosecutor relies on inadmissible evidence or plays to
prejudice, she seeks what might be called "reverse jury nullfication"-conviction when the evidence and law technically may not support that result. However, no legal rule or historical tradition supports
the validity of reverse nullification.19 This is significant because, unlike
defense counsel, prosecutors have no separate client-oriented obligations that justify circumventing the law's limits on persuasion. The
codes commit prosecutors to pursuing adversarial justice, which includes a verdict based exclusively on evidence that the fact finders legally may consider.
The obligation to do adversarial justice thus imposes limits on the
prosecution that do not apply fully to the defense. Although prosecutors may aggressively advocate their interpretations of the evidence,
they share a responsibility for assuring that the evidence itself is of the
type jurors in the adversary system may rely on. Prosecutors have a
greater duty than defense counsel to prejudge their evidence; prosecuadvantage).
192. The Supreme Court emphatically has rejected the federal jury's right to set aside a trial
judge's instructions on the law. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Although
three state constitutions specifically empower juries to decide the law, see GA. CONST., art. I, § 1;
IND. CONST., art. I, § 19; MD. CONST., art. 23, many state courts have rejected the notion of nullification. Scholars disagree on its appropriateness. Compare Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REv. 488, 490 (1976) ("jury nullification has no place,
historically or functionally, in the federal jurisprudence") with Kunstler, Jury Nullification in
Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 83 (1969) (jury nullification "is now a fundamental tenet of
our federal jurisprudence") and Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 169 (1972) (the right to instruction authorizing nullification is "grounded upon the role
of the jury in a constitutional democracy").
Nevertheless, jurors unquestionably have the power to nullify, see Simson, supra, at 488, and
courts have let defense counsel encourage juries to exercise the power. See, e.g., United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969) (reversing trial judge's use of special verdict forms designed to
enforce jury's adherence to the law); United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76
(2d Cir.) (discussing reasons for jury's right to reject the law), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269
(1942); see also authorities discussed in Scheflin, supra,at 199-201. In effect, courts recognize and
allow the nullification defense, but refuse to tell the jury that it is appropriate. See United States
v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969) (a jury has the power to nullify, but the trial court
was correct to instruct the jury on its duty to follow the law); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969) ("We recognize. . . the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if
its verdict is contrary to the law"). For an excellent discussion of jury nullification and an explanation of how and why the tradition persists despite the case law forbidding it, see M. KADISH & S.
KAnISH, DISCRMON

TO

DisoBEY 50-56 (1973).

193. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 419, 421-23, 13 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Crim. App.
1929) (forbidding prosecutor to urge the jury to reject a legal defense despite its support in the
evidence); Fleming v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 160, 161-63, 5 S.W.2d 899, 899-900 (1928) (same).
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tors have no valid reason to encourage courts to let them rely on unintroduced facts or play to juror prejudice.19 4 To analyze the meaning of
this one-sided obligation in practice, the following discussion considers
examples from three different stages of trial.
a. The Jury Selection Process
In the course of jury selection, the prosecutor seeks to improve her chances of winning by planting the seeds of her trial theory in the prospective jurors' minds and
by mentioning evidence that may be ruled inadmissible.

Does the prosecutor in the foregoing scenario satisfy the duty to do
justice? Private lawyers typically manipulate the jury selection process
for purposes other than picking an impartial, representative jury. They
use voir dire to sensitize jurors to their arguments, present evidence at
an early stage, and impanel strong-willed jurors who bring with them
favorable biases. The hypothetical squarely poses the question of
whether prosecutors may respond in kind.
A few model codes proscribe particular methods of jury selection,
regardless of which side attempts to use them. The ABA Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, for example, instructs both prosecution
and defense not to "intentionally use the voir dire to present factual
matter which the [lawyer] knows will not be admissible at trial or to
argue the [lawyer's] case to the jury. 1 9 5 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsibility leave
control of jury selection to judicial discretion, with one notable exception: neither lawyer may "state or allude to any matter that he has no
reasonable belief is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence."9' Beyond that caveat, the codes typically pro9 or
scribe only selection procedures that are "prohibited by law"'M
9
8
designed to "harass" the panel.' As an ethical matter, defense counsel
are governed primarily by the requirement of zealous representation of
their client and prosecutors by the amorphous "do justice" concept. 99
In light of the codes' limited ethical prohibitions, if the governing
194. Largely for this reason, most courts have rejected the notion that improper argument by
defense counsel invites a prosecutorial response in kind. See, e.g., United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d
1335, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979); Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 103, 677 P.2d 261, 266 (1984); cf.
United States v. Perry, 643 F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 1981) (government's response to attack on credibility of government's case was "understandable, if not laudable").
195. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standards 3-5.3(c), 4-7.2(c).
196. CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-106(C); accord MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(e).
197. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.5(a).
198. CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-108(D).
199. See J. DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 309 ("By condemning only the interjection of impermissible evidence... the Commentary [to the ABA Standards] appears to acknowledge that both
counsel will attempt to influence the jury during voir dire").
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court procedures let lawyers argue trial theory in voir dire and arguing
will help the defendant's case, defense counsel will use the tactic.20 0 Adversarial justice principles permit prosecutors to compete-to advocate
as zealously as the defense. Indeed, when a defense lawyer introduces
argument early, the system actually may depend on the prosecutor to
counteract it. According to adversary theory, the fact finder should be
20 1
kept aware of conflicting theories at each stage of the proceeding.
Now consider the next step: May a prosecutor ethically mention
evidence in voir dire that she knows may be ruled inadmissible at
trial? 202 Under the code provisions applicable to all lawyers, the only
issue seems to be whether a lawyer has a "reasonable belief' that his
statement can be "supported by admissible evidence."2 03 Private counsel who can make a good faith argument for admissibility owe it to their
clients to let the judge determine and remedy any overstatement.2 4
Under the adversarial interpretation of "doing justice," however, the
prosecutor's ability to make a plausible argument for admissibility is
insufficient.
The prosecutor must reconcile conflicting roles. As an advocate furthering competitive fact-finding, she must try to make her strongest legitimate presentation. As a "minister" of the adversary system, she
must assure that defendants are tried in accordance with the system's
premise that jurors rely only on facts in the record. Whether or not the
prosecutor can find a good faith evidentiary argument, she knows a
questionable voir dire statement may detract from adversarially appropriate decision making if it is later ruled inadmissible.20 5 The "do justice" requirement prevents her from simply applying the literal rules,
pushing her presentation to the limits, and leaving it to court and adversary to worry about the presentation's effects.
200. Usually, courts require lawyers to accomplish the sensitizing process in the course of
framing otherwise valid voir dire questions. In other words, lawyers must speak in terms that at
least nominally relate to gathering information for selecting or disqualifying prospective jurors.

201. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
202. Of course, in doing so the prosecutor risks a subsequent mistrial or reversal. But as a
legal matter, the mere fact that jurors hear prejudicial evidence often does not rise to the level of
error requiring retrial.
203. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
204. The codes require good faith in recognition of the fact that all lawyers have some obligation to constrain behavior that is damaging to the system. "The jurors must determine the issues
upon the evidence. Counsel's address should help them do this, not tend to lead them astray."
CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-106(C) n.81 (quoting Cherry Creek Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
207 A.D. 787, 790-91, 202 N.Y.S. 611, 614 (App. Div. 1924)). By not requiring private lawyers to
determine admissibility, however, the codes again make paramount the obligation to advance client interests zealously.
205. See D. LunAN, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that "the problem [with good faith requirements] is that the notion of 'good faith' is itself open to instrumentalist manipulation").
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In some respects, "doing justice" directs the prosecutor in choosing
among her options. It points to a balance that depends partly on subjective factors. If a prosecutor refers to evidence for the primary purpose of bringing inadmissible information to the jury's attention, she
seeks to undermine the adversary system's mechanism for producing
appropriate results. This conduct would directly violate her duty under
an adversarial approach to the ethical rule.
Even if the prosecutor has the pure motive of selecting and persuading jurors in the most effective legitimate way, the "do justice"
mandate obliges her to consider the effect her statement will have on
the trial's decision-making process. She must recognize that, if the
court later rejects the underlying evidence, the negative impact on the
jurors' ability to decide properly cannot be undone. The adversarial interpretation of justice at least suggests baseline considerations: the
prosecutor must determine whether the risk of infecting adversarial decision making can be avoided and, if not, whether the benefits of making the voir dire statements justify the risk to the system's proper
operation.
It is at this point that the prosecutor may need more guidance than
even an adversarial interpretation of justice provides. To minimize her
dilemma, the prosecutor probably should avail herself of reasonable opportunities to seek advance rulings on the admissibility of dubious evidence, even if such motions come at a cost. Yet tactical reasons often
prevent motions in limine, and judges may refuse to rule.2 0 The prosecutor then is left to make a two-fold prejudgment of her own. She must
assess the likelihood that the evidence will be received and the importance to her presentation of introducing it at an early stage.
When she weighs the results, the ethical response may become evident: she should not risk infecting the process if the evidence underlying her statement is unlikely to be received. If, however, the prosecutor
believes the evidence will be admitted, her reaction cannot be automatic. The adversarial justice approach requires her to look hard at the
actual value of mentioning it early on. In the difficult case, notions of
adversarial justice simply offer the prosecutor a cautionary guide: if she
can avoid endangering the fact-finding process without undermining
her advocacy, her duty to the system requires that she forego even potentially justifiable comments.
206. The prosecutor may hesitate to file a motion in limine because doing so attracts attention to the questionable piece of evidence and may foster an objection that otherwise might not
surface.
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b. Witness Examination
Consider now the prosecutor's duty to preserve appropriate factfinding at the witness examination stage and, in particular, the extent
to which prosecutors may seek to mislead the jury. Monroe Freedman
has posited that defense counsel must try to win at virtually all cost,
while prosecutors should neither rely on witnesses whose information
they question nor cast doubt on defense witnesses they believe to be
truthful.2 ° Is the adversarial justice model in accord?
The codes do not seem to adopt Freedman's unilateral approach." 8
Lawyers may not "knowingly" offer "false" information. 0 9 In some instances, lawyers are forbidden to allude to matter "that will not be supported by admissible evidence."21 0 But only the ABA Standards
Relating to the Administration of Justice draw a specific distinction
between the prosecution and defense in witness examination.2 11 The

Standards (and their distinctions) were not incorporated into the
Model Rules. 2
207. See generally M. FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 79-89; Freedman, supra note 38, at
1033-35. See also Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response, 55 GEo. L.J. 1048, 1049-58 (1967)
(responding to Freedman's position); Edwards, supra note 45, at 533 ("In cross-examining a defense witness whom he knows to be telling the truth, the prosecutor should not attempt to use
techniques that make it appear that the witness is lying, since to do so would mislead the court");
Schwartz, supra note 135, at 1140-43 (discussing justifications for allowing ordinary lawyers to
impeach truthful witnesses); cf. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 13.10.4, at 766 (prosecutor may "not
employ forensic gambits whose use by other lawyers may be tolerated").
208. The National District Attorneys Association's standards do forbid asking questions that
"impl[y] the existence of a factual predicate which the prosecution knows to be untrue." NDAA
STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standard 17.6(B).
On the reasoning that the form of some questioning implies personal knowledge of the prosecutor that will carry weight with the jury, some courts have reversed convictions for improper
cross-examination. See, e.g., Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 102, 677 P.2d 261, 267 n.7 (1984)
(asking "you're pretty much a cool talker, aren't you?"); People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 757-62,
409 N.E.2d 897, 903-06, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 427-31 (1980) (threatening the witness with a charge of
perjury); People v. Nunez, 74 A.D.2d 805-06, 426 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3-4 (App. Div. 1980) (implying that
the witness was instructed to lie).
209. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(4); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A); ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standards 3-5.6(a), 4-7.5.
210. CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-106(C)(1).
211. The ABA Standardsinstruct prosecutors not to "use the power of cross-examination to
discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness is testifying truthfully." ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standard 3-5.7(b). Compare the defense standard, which states, "A
lawyer's belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination, but should, if possible, be taken into consideration by counsel in conducting the cross-examination." Id. Standard 4-7.6(b).
212. See Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 651, 675-76 (suggesting that defense counsel should be
able to cast doubt on a probably truthful prosecution witness, and questioning whether prosecutors
should be treated differently than the defense); cf. Civiletti, supra note 64, at 18 (noting that codes
treat prosecutors and defense attorneys equally, but that in practice prosecutors should be more
restrained in making truthful witnesses look untruthful).
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Interpreting the "do justice" rule through the lens of adversarial
premises supports Freedman's double standard, but only in part. To
the extent the rule reaffirms the adversary system, it suggests that prosecutors need not act as judges of their witness's testimony unless they
are sure the witness is falsifying facts; nor should prosecutors treat a
defense witness gingerly simply because they sense the witness is trustworthy. 13 The prosecution's function in illuminating truth is as a participant in a point-counterpoint process of advocacy. Theoretically,
questionable prosecution witnesses will falter upon cross-examination
by the defense. Similarly, with defense counsel's help, truthful defense
witnesses can withstand cross-examination that seeks to distort their
evidence. As long as a prosecutor pursues a line of examination in good
faith, the adversarial model would let her sublimate her personal belief
concerning the strength of the witness's testimony to her role as
advocate.214
At the same time, the adversarial interpretation of "doing justice"
reinforces Freedman's position in the more extreme scenario: prosecutors should not rely on information they know to be false or pursue
questions that suggest false factual predicates. Evidentiary and ethical
rules render the underlying data inadmissible, whether presented by
the prosecution or defense.21 5 Even when a defense lawyer circumvents
the evidentiary/ethical guidelines because of his client-centered role,
the prosecutor must honor the spirit of the rules. As a "minister," she is
responsible for safeguarding the adversary system's fact-finding process;
she must assure that jurors rely only on properly introduced evidence.
Regardless of defense counsel's conduct, the prosecutor's one-sided
duty to do justice creates an absolute prohibition against supplying in213. As this Article discusses, a prosecutor should not discredit a witness by suggesting facts
that she knows are false. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. However, she should not
hesitate to test the accuracy of the witness's assertions or credibility and leave the task of judging
the value of the testimony to the jury.
214. I do not take the position that this is the best resolution of the witness examination
issue, merely that this resolution is what the codes' underlying theory suggests. To interpret "do
justice" as forcing prosecutors to evaluate the strength of their evidence and to adjust their
presentations accordingly is inconsistent with the thrust of the codes. See supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text. At the same time, I acknowledge that the drafters properly might conclude
that prosecutors routinely should prejudge their witness examinations, and that the drafters reasonably could adopt specific rules to that effect. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text; cf.
Luban, supra note 26, at 1031 (noting that, even under the professional codes, all lawyers retain
discretion to choose tactics less "brutal" than making a truthful witness look false).
215. See MODnE RULEs, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(1), (4); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7102(A)(4), (5); see also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (prosecutor's use of false evidence
violates due process); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that prosecutor's failure
to correct witness's false testimony denied the defendant due process of law); Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28, 29-31 (1957) (prosecutor committed error in allowing witness to suggest false facts on
direct examination).
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formation jurors should not consider.21 6

This Article takes no position on whether code drafters should
adopt Freedman's whole approach or on what constitutes proper conduct by the defense. The analysis simply suggests that one cannot read
Freedman's full theory into the prevailing "do justice" provisions. In
the ordinary case, the codes' thrust is to let prosecutors act as zealous
advocates in offering questionable witnesses and discrediting the opponent's witnesses. Except in extreme situations, the codes let prosecutors
assume that competitive trials will adequately ferret out truth.2 17 Only
in situations in which fair adversarial process is itself at risk do the "do
justice" provisions impose the double
standard for conduct that Freed18
man advocates across-the-board.

c. Argument
The area of prosecutorial conduct that has received the most attention is argument in opening and closing statements.21 9 Courts enforcing
216. Murray Schwartz reaches similar conclusions through a different analysis. In his view,
prosecutors, like defense counsel, are in theory entitled to impeach truthful witnesses in order to
probe and expose their "level of certainty." However, the prosecutor becomes burdened with additional responsibility when she knows the witness is truthful because this knowledge triggers her
independent duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. See Schwartz, supra note 135, at 1144.
217. Thus, ordinarily, prosecutors need not themselves decide the strength of the evidence or
prejudge substantive rulings regarding witness examination. See Uviller, supra note 19, at 1159
(when the prosecutor "is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw
in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the judge or jury"); cf. Mills v.
Scully, 653 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (prosecutor's reliance on false testimony mitigated by
defense counsel's knowledge and ability to prove falsity).
This adversarial approach to prosecutions is at odds with the view of some judges. In People v.
Ellis, 94 A.D.2d 652, 652-53, 462 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (App. Div. 1983), for example, the court relied
upon the codes' "do justice" concept to hold that a prosecutor should have refrained voluntarily
from impeaching the defendant with remote, but admissible, convictions. The court, however, offered neither an analysis of why pursuing the impeachment constituted a failure of "justice" nor
an explanation of other types of examination that ethical prosecutors should forgo.
218. In one aspect of witness examination, the mandate clearly supports a double standard.
It imposes on prosecutors a unique responsibility to second-guess judges on examination procedures. A judge who incorrectly restricts defense counsel's direct examination may give the prosecution an unfair advantage. In effect, the judge may shape the trial to put a fundamental premise of
adversarial justice-that the parties have an equal opportunity to present the relevant facts-at
risk. As discussed earlier, such a breakdown in the adversarial process may require the ethical
prosecutor to take remedial steps. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
The prosecutor's options in this scenario are many. She can suggest to the court that counsel
be allowed to proceed. She can avoid pressing the advantage by not objecting on relevance grounds
to rephrased questions. She herself may open the door to the restricted line of questioning, thus
allowing defense counsel to proceed. At a minimum, she should assist the defense counsel in making a record for appeal.
219. See generally Alschuler, supra note 6, at 629, 644-77 (discussing remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct in argument); Balske, ProsecutorialMisconduct During Closing Argument: The Arts of Knowing When and How to Object and of Avoiding the "Invited Response"
Doctrine, 37 MERcER L. REv. 1033 (1986) (discussing when vociferous defense argument invites
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due process standards frequently have looked at cases in which prosecutors emphasize the heinousness of the crime, vilify the defendant,
evoke juror sympathy for the victims, and appeal to prejudice. Despite
numerous due process decisions and abundant commentary, the resulting case law offers few standards for proper prosecutorial argument.2 0
Appellate courts have assessed trials on a case-by-case basis, attempting to determine whether the jurors could have reached a fair or correct
result.22 ' Prosecutors are left to govern their own conduct, with little to
guide them except a generalized fear of reversal for "overargument"
222
and a commitment to satisfying their ethical obligation to do justice.
Some standards governing argument are clear: like other lawyers,
prosecutors may argue only facts in evidence; 223 they may not express
their personal opinions; 224 they may not comment on a defendant's failprosecutorial- response in kind); Crump, The Function and Limits of ProsecutionJury Argument,
28 Sw. L.J. 505 (1974) (arguing for rules governing the content of argument); Genson & Martin,
supra note 13, at 39 (calling for enhanced policing of rules against prosecutorial misconduct in
argument); Vess, supra note 54, at 22 (surveying limits on prosecutorial summations).
220. Albert Alschuler has noted the inconsistency present in judicial decisions governing
prosecutorial arguments that categorize the defendant in colorful terms:
It has been held reversible error to call the defendant . . . a "cheap, scaly, slimy crook," a
"leech of society," a user of "Al Capone tactics of intimidation," and a "junkie, rat and 'sculptor' with a knife." Courts have, however, found no error in cases in which the defendant was
called "animalistic," "lowdown, degenerate and filthy," "a mad dog," "a rattlesnake," "a trafficker in human misery," "a blackhearted traitor," "a hired gunfighter, .... a creature of the
jungle," "a type of worm," or "a brute, a beast, an animal, a mad dog who does not deserve to
live."
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 642 (footnotes omitted). Compare, e.g., People v. Washington, 71 Cal.
2d 1061, 458 P.2d 479, 492, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969) (commenting on the brutality of the crime)
and People v. Nemke, 46 IMI.2d 49, 59, 263 N.E.2d 97, 102 (1970) (same) with Perez v. State, 466
S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (improper to describe crime as the "worst murder" the
prosecutor ever saw).
221. The underlying fear is that jurors fired by prejudice or emotion will convict the defendant because he personifies the evil discussed by the prosecutor, regardless of whether this defendant actually was involved in the crime.
222. See Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations upon the Prosecutor'sRole As an
Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1095, 1135 (1980) ("despite efforts by the courts, the American Bar
Association, and commentators to define proper and improper [prosecutorial argument], the guidelines available to the practicing attorney are either vague or inadequate").
223. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(e) (stating that a lawyer shall not allude to
matter that is irrelevant or unsupported by admissible evidence); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7106(C)(1) (same); see also authorities cited in Vess, supra note 54, at 28 nn.58-60, 29 nn.65-70.
224. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(e); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-106(C)(4); see
also Note, Expression of Opinion by ProsecutingAttorney to Jury, 25 MIcH. L. REv. 203 (1926).
As applied to prosecutors, these provisions can be justified on the basis of adversarial justice. By
expressing a personal opinion, the prosecutor encourages jurors to rely on her word rather than on
their own neutral judgment. Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478
U.S. 1016 (1986); see also State v. Bujnowski, 130 N.H. 1, 4-5, 532 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1987) (prosecutor approaches jury "with the inevitable asset of tremendous credibility"); People v. Castelo, 24
A.D.2d 827, 827, 264 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (App. Div. 1965) (prosecutor "convinced" that defendant
was guilty); Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo. 1982) (prosecutor's "respect" in the commu-
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ure to testify or present a defense.225 Beyond those caveats, neither the
language of the codes nor the judicial decisions define how vociferously
prosecutors may argue or to what extent they may appeal to the sympathies and common experience of the jurors.228 For every commentator

who concludes that prosecutors commit misconduct by appealing to
emotion, another can be found who suggests that arousing jurors is the
role of summation.227
To understand how the adversarial justice framework defines more
concrete ethical limits, we again must focus on specific cases. Consider
the following situation:
In a prosecution involving a brutal murder, the district attorney introduces bloody
nity may transform trial into contest between prosecutor and defense counsel's credibility). Alternatively, the prosecutor suggests that she knows additional relevant facts which she was not
permitted to introduce. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1179 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982); see also People v. Perez, 58 Cal. 2d 229, 241-42, 373 P.2d 617, 626, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 576 (1962) (en banc) (expressing personal belief regarding witness's credibility); State v.
Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Me. 1982) (same); People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 280-81, 451
N.E.2d 212, 215-16, 464 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (1983) (same); cf. People v. Ivey, 83 A.D.2d 788, 789,
443 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453-54 (App. Div. 1981) (reversal for commenting on court's failure to admit
important evidence).
225. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965); United States v. Perry, 643
F.2d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d
110, 112-13 (7th Cir. 1980); Hawk v. State, 482 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See generally Vess, supra note 54, at 35-38 and authorities cited therein.
226. Cf. J. DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 406 ("The NDAA standards on argument content is
pretty plain vanilla, stating only 'Counsel's argument to the jury should be characterized by fairness, accuracy, rationality, and a reliance upon the evidence' "). The courts generally recognize
that prosecutors may illustrate or dramatize their points by referring "to historical facts, public
personalities,'principles of divine law, biblical teachings, or prominent current events in the community or the nation." Vess, supra note 54, at 30 & n.76 (footnote omitted).
227. For example, in a seminal article on prosecutorial argument, Albert Alschuler suggests
that the prosecutor "should not think of oratory as part of his job at all... .. He should... strive
for more 'Chesterfieldian politeness.' The prosecutor should forego not only appeals to prejudice,
but any deliberate appeal to emotion." Alschuler, supra note 6, at 636. In contrast, commentators
associated with prosecuting offices would afford more leeway for forceful argument. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note 58, at 542 ("Virtually all of prosecutorial ethics can be reduced to a single precept:
'Prosecute only those you believe to be guilty and press that prosecution forcefully, according to
the rules' "); Seymour, supra note 54, at 312-13. Most commentators agree that judicial standards
defining the limits of oratorical flourish are lacking. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 634; Note,
Criminal Trial Practice-Prosecutor'sClosing Argument-Pleas for Law Enforcement and
Proper Inferences from the Evidence, 43 Mo. L. REv. 342, 347 & nn.30-39 (1978) ("courts are
continuously handing down inconsistent opinions regarding the reasonableness of similar
statements").
The model codes conflict as well. The NDAA Standards, for example, suggest that all closing
arguments "should be characterized by fairness, accuracy, rationality, and a reliance upon the
evidence." NDAA STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standard 17.17(A) (emphasis added). The ABA
Standards,in contrast, allow prosecutors to argue "all reasonable inferences from [the] evidence"
and "matters of common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience." ABA STANDAXDS, supra note 131, Standards 3-5.8, 3-5.9 (emphasis added). But the ABA Standards also
forbid "arguments calculated to inflame the passions.., of the jury." Id. Standard 3-5.8 (emphasis added).
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photographs, emphasizes multiple wounds inflicted upon the victim, and describes
the alleged murderer as a butcher coolly slaughtering an innocent lamb.

Some courts might determine that this summation violates due
process because it "is unfair" or "evokes too much sympathy." Yet it is
difficult to see how the prosecutor has acted unprofessionally. As long
as defense counsel can point out that her remarks have little to do with
the identity of the murderer, the prosecutor has not undermined adversarial justice. In the adversary system, a defendant's remedy for a vociferous closing argument by the prosecution is an effective summation of
his own.22 s Indeed, it would undermine truth-seeking to let defense lawyers stimulate a jury, while confining prosecutors to a dry, rational recitation of the facts.22 9 Juror sympathy is consistent with adversarial
justice as long as that sympathy derives from the evidence.
The helter-skelter due process and prosecutorial misconduct decisions generally fail to recognize the distinction between sympathy stemming from the evidence and that which does not;230 the courts prefer to
assess the general fairness of the whole trial, after the fact.23 1 But the
distinction is key for prosecutors who, planning arguments ex ante,
strive to satisfy their obligation to the codes. It means that prosecutors
ethically may not seek conviction based on sympathy or prejudice that
jurors bring to the opening of court. On the other hand, arguments emphasizing victim pain or the seriousness of particular crimes may stem
from the record and, if so, can fit legitimately within the contours of the
adversarial scheme. To say that a prosecutor inflamed the jury's sympathy may mean only that she argued effectively, with verve and zeal. She
cannot be deemed unprofessional on that ground alone.
Under the adversarial approach, the propriety of vociferous
prosecutorial argument thus depends not on the jury's reaction, but
rather on the reason for the reaction. The "do justice" rule, like due
228. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors make the final summation or have an opportunity for
rebuttal. The ability of defense counsel to counteract specific emotional arguments thus may depend, in part, on counsel's ability to predict the argument. In extremely rare cases in which the
defense clearly needs an opportunity to rebut, the court may allow it.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J.) ("truth is
not likely to emerge, if the prosecution is confined to such detached exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture, while the defense is allowed those appeals in misericordiam which long custom
has come to sanction"), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936).
230. But see Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 951 (11th Cir. 1983) (inflammatory evidence and
argument, including pictures of body and fragments of corpse, are admissible because they are
rooted in the facts of case), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); see also Vess, supra note 54, at 27
& n.48 ("The general rule

. . .

is that ...

comment[ing] [on the evidence] is proper if it is either

proved by direct evidence or is a fair and reasonable inference from the facts and circumstances
proved and has bearing on an issue").
231. Presumably, in the hypothetical case, some courts would hold the argument unconstitutional, while others would not. For obvious reasons, such after-the-fact decision making causes
prosecutors extreme difficulty in determining what they legally can say.
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process decisions, forbids ploys resting on sympathy or prejudice, but
only if those emotions are extrajudicial-not rooted in the admissible
facts of the case.23 2 Similarly, "doing justice" requires that prosecutorial
appeals to common experience relate to the record.2 3 Prosecutors
charged with maintaining adversarial justice justifiably can be expected
to confine their zeal to the body of knowledge that the decision maker
permissibly may consider.
The adversarial approach does not always answer whether a particular argument is appropriate, but a few more examples will illustrate
how it at least provides guidance. Consider an extreme case:
In prosecuting a black defendant accused of raping a white woman, the prosecutor
plans-subtly-to appeal to any racial prejudice the jurors may have.2 3

Here the prosecutor, in effect, seeks a conviction based on factors
irrelevant to the alleged crime. One can look at her goal in two ways. On
one view, the prosecutor wants the .jury to rely on information that is
not in the record. On another, she hopes to convert the jurors into biased fact finders who are unable to sift the arguments in a neutral way.
Under either characterization, the prosecutor undermines a key adversarial premise-in direct contravention of her ethical obligation to uphold the system.3 5
232. After compiling the cases, one commentator has noted that the only improper argument
is one the "sole effect" of which is to inflame passion or arouse prejudice and thereby to bring
about a conviction based on factors other than the evidence. In his view, "[t]he questions for review are to what extent, for what reasons, and with what effect were the arguments advanced."
Vess, supra note 54, at 50 & nn.229-31.
233. A few courts have followed this approach in deciding whether a prosecutor's argument
violates constitutional due process standards. See, e.g., Schmidtberger v. United States, 129 F.2d
390, 392 (8th Cir. 1942) (prosecutor may use "invective language, if it accords with the evidence");
State v. Nichelsen, 546 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (if the prosecutor "stays within the
confines of the evidence and its reasonable inferences therefrom, the argument is legitimate"); see
also State v. Feger, 340 S.W.2d 716, 728 (Mo. 1960) (same).
234. Cf. McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversal on due process
grounds for "illogical" reference to race that risked "stirring racially prejudiced attitudes"); United
States v. Home, 423 F.2d 630, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1970) (racial argument improper); Dawson v. State,
734 P.2d 221, 223 (Nev. 1987) (same); People v. DePasquale, 54 Misc. 2d 91, 91-92, 281 N.Y.S.2d
963, 963-64 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (reference to race, nationality, or religion should be avoided when
possible).
235. An issue separate from appeals to bias is the question of whether a prosecutor ethically
may seek to impanel a racially or religiously imbalanced jury in the hope that it will be biased. The
ethical codes are silent on the subject. The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their
race." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (emphasis added); see also People v. Payne, 106
Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (App. Ct. 1982) (illustrating pre-Batson theory focusing on need
to avoid the appearance of discriminatory intent). However, the Court did acknowledge the prosecutor's right to justify exclusions based on a "neutral explanation related to the particular case."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Thus, constitutional parameters do not define fully those occasions in
which a prosecutor may take jurors' potential biases into account in seeking favorable panelists.
Purely impartial jurors cannot exist. The whole panel brings with them experiences and atti-

100

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:45

Now consider a scenario in which the solution is less clear.
A prosecutor believes that a defendant accused of selling drugs is a menace to society and wants to evoke the same belief in the jury. She considers two possible lines
of argument. In the first, she would present a strong, emotional discussion of the
dangers of drug sales on the streets and in the schools. Alternatively, she would
this
offer a vivid and emotional description of the likely effect 23
6 defendant's sale
would have on persons like the buyer in the charged offense.

Both versions are designed to create a setting prejudicial to the defendant's claim of innocence. But in the first, the prosecutor would encourage the jury to convict the defendant of crimes with which he has
not been charged--to bear responsibility for the societal drug problem.
In other words, the prosecutor would try to persuade the jury to convict
based on facts that were not introduced and that, in essence, have little

to do with the case.
In contrast, the images on which the second summation relies are
rooted in the evidence, the crime charged (selling drugs to this victim),
and its immediate effects.23 7 As an evidentiary matter, courts always
tudes that will favor one side or the other. Like defense counsel, the prosecutor's job is to select
the most favorable and eliminate the most unsympathetic. Yet at some level of bias, a juror can no
longer be viewed as a "neutral fact finder"-can no longer be expected to reach a decision constrained by the evidence. The prosecutor's duty to adversarial justice means the prosecutor should
avoid impanelling jurors who carry this baggage.
Suppose that a prosecutor in a racially divided community regularly challenges young male
black jurors. If the prosecutor uses this juror profile only in cases involving black defendants, on a
theory that whites are more willing to convict blacks, then she seeks a less-than-neutral jury that
will look beyond the facts. On the other hand, a prosecutor who believes young black males are
defense-oriented and who applies the profile even in cases involving white defendants acts like the
typical advocate. She does not press an advantage arising from a fault in the system. She merely
selects a fact finder who fits within a large pool of persons with acceptable. "neutral" predilections.
As an ethical (not constitutional) matter, the adversarial justice model would allow the prosecutor
to solicit jurors who maximize the chances of victory as long as the basic adversarial premises are
intact.
236. I say "like the buyer" because the buyer actually may be an undercover agent. Under
my approach, the prosecutor would be within her rights to develop an argument around the state
of facts as the defendant perceived them to be. Thus, if the defendant sold drugs to someone
whom he believed to be a child in a depressed ghetto, but who actually was a police agent from a
middle-class neighborhood, the prosecutor should be able to discuss the hypothetical victim.
237. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed similar reasoning in upholding a
prosecutor's emotional appeal for the death penalty because the defendant, if alive, could kill
someone else's daughter. The Court held that in another context the statements would violate due
process, but here were "directly relevant to the consideration of whether [the defendant] would
remain a threat to society." Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1411 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478
U.S. 1016 (1987). But cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 478 Pa. 76, 81, 385 A.2d 1320, 1323 (1978)
(improper to describe the defendant as "vicious, desperate criminal who would kill for a nickel").
Courts differ on the degree to which prosecutors may extrapolate from a specific crime to a
general crime problem in the locality. In People v. Williams, 65 Mich. App. 753, 755, 238 N.W.2d
186, 187 (Ct. App. 1975), the court reversed a case in which a prosecutor argued that the jury had
an "opportunity to [a]ffect the drug traffic in this city." Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474
Pa. 295, 378 A.2d 800, 805 (1977), the court reversed a case in which the prosecution told the jury
that they should send a message to the community that shootings would not be tolerated. In con-
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have permitted some discussion of the nature of the crime charged,
even though it is only tangentially relevant to the issue of guilt. 3 s The

hypothetical prosecutor's emphasis on this crime's seriousness and its
effect on victims may reduce the defendant's ability to claim nonparticipation, but would not totally undermine it by diverting the jury's
focus from this case. Defense counsel remains in a fair position to
counteract the jury's tendency to convict on less-than-solid evidence.
The more difficult case appears at the margin. Assume the following scenario:
In a case involving an alleged serial killer, the prosecutor realizes that the evidence
connecting the defendant to the crimes is weak. To bolster her argument, she plans
to equate the defendant to the worst of history's killers, including Hitler.

This scenario bears some resemblance to the two drug hypotheticals. On the surface, the prosecutor merely plans to emphasize the heinousness of the charged offense through oratorical flourish. The jury
probably can recognize that the reference to Hitler's crimes is a metaphor rather than an example of conduct for which the defendant is responsible. Yet the summation comes close to asking the jury to convict
the defendant for uncharged crimes, based on events that are not even
arguably related to the defendant's acts. 3 9 If, as the argument is
trast, other courts have upheld arguments emphasizing the effects of a crime similar to that committed by the defendant. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 47 Ala. App. 51, 54, 249 So. 2d 872, 875
(Crim. App. 1971) (approving reference, in course of arson prosecution, to recent instances of arson
in city); Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 403, 67 N.E.2d 377, 380 (1946) (discussing illegal strikes'
effects on war effort).
Under the adversarial justice framework, the nexus between the argument and the facts in the
record is the key. A prosecutor who confines herself to the charged crime but emphasizes its heinousness does not ask the jurors to exceed their function. She simply asks the representatives of
the community to judge the defendant in the context of their common knowledge of serious crime
in the community. See Note, supra note 227, at 344-45 and authorities cited therein (noting that
generalized comments about the "community crime wave" or the "need for deterrence" are permissible under Missouri law, but not an argument that the particular defendant is a habitual criminal
and will commit new crimes if released). As the prosecutor strays to dissimilar crimes, she seeks
reverse jury nullification-a conviction based on fears that have nothing to do with the facts of the
case. But see Celebrezze, supra note 13, at 243-44 (the prosecutor should not raise issues broader
than the guilt or innocence of the accused); Comment, The Prosecutor's Closing Argument in
Pennsylvania:The Quasi-JudicialParadox,82 Dic L. REV. 513, 536 nn.188-94, 537 (1978) ("The
line should be drawn when the prosecution ceases to try the accused for the crime with which he
has been charged and instead incites jury emotion to convict the defendant for crime in general").
238. See infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
239. In contrast, an emotional argument without the Hitler reference might be appropriate
because it does not ask the jury to consider facts not in the record. See Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1413
(reference to the defendant as "cancer on the body of society" is "dramatic," but goes "directly to
the appropriate concern"); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) (argument that
defendant was "less than human," "not somebody in our society that we can afford to keep," and
"a time bomb" was supported by evidence in the record).
For the most part, courts have ruled inconsistently and without analysis upon prosecutorial
references to historical atrocities. Compare People v. Lion, 10 IMI.2d 208, 216, 139 N.E.2d 757, 761
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phrased, the jury reasonably might connect the defendant's murders
with Hitler's, the prosecutor has gone too far.
The scenario also shares attributes with the hypothetical involving
racism. The reference to Hitler's Germany can evoke both religious and
historically based sentiments that may interfere with some jurors' ability to reason.24 0 No amount of counterargument by the defense will be
able to cleanse the attitude of jurors so affected. The prosecutor's
planned closing may create a real possibility that the defendant will be
judged by a nonneutral fact finder.
As this final scenario illustrates, the concept of adversarial justice
does not solve all summation questions. But it is a step forward. Constitutional platitudes like "prosecutors may not appeal to emotion" are
inadequate to guide prosecutors because judges do not uniformly mean
or enforce them. In essence, these platitudes tell prosecutors little more
than that some rhetorical flourishes are appropriate, but others are not.
The adversarial interpretation of the codes, in contrast, offers a framework by which a prosecutor at least can analyze the ethical issues. This
interpretation reassures the prosecutor that advocacy which evokes
emotion remains one of her tools. But if the thrust of her appeal is to
weaken the fact finder's impartiality, ability to reason, or willingness to
consider only appropriate facts, the prosecutor can recognize that she
puts the system's underpinnings-and justice-at risk.24
(1957) (comparing defendant to Alger Hiss is possibly improper) with McKeever v. State, 118 Ga.
App. 386, 390-91, 163 S.E.2d 919, 922-23 (Ct. App. 1969) (comparing defendant to Viet Cong is a
"permissible inference").
240. See Vess, supra note 54, at 32 (the "primary question . . . is whether . . . the juror's
fears and prejudices will be aroused in a way which impairs reasoned judgment"); see also Skuy v.
United States, 261 F. 316 (8th Cir. 1919) (granting reversal for anti-Semitic argument). But see
Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1930) (denying reversal for district attorney's anti-Semitic statement).
241. Using this approach, a prosecutor can recognize the impropriety of such conduct as personally attacking defense counsel, emphasizing societal crimes that have no relationship to the
case, or referring to the conclusion by others in the criminal justice system that the defendant is
guilty. See, e.g., People v. Podwys, 6 Cal. App. 2d 71, 74-75, 44 P.2d 377, 378-79 (Ct. App. 1935)
(attack on defense counsel violates due process); People v. Johnson, 62 A.D.2d 555, 559-60, 405
N.Y.S.2d 538, 541 (App. Div. 1978) (same); Harris v. State, 475 S.W.2d 922, 923-24 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972) (reference to grand jury indictment improper); State v. Boyd, 160 W. Va. 234, 244, 233
S.E.2d 710, 717-18 (1977) (attack on defense counsel violates due process). In contrast, despite
suggestions in the case law that referring to a victim and her family are improper appeals to sympathy, calmly describing the effect of the alleged crime arguably is rooted in the evidence. Compare Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1410 (argument that family will miss victim at Thanksgiving "was no
more than a compelling statement of the victim's death and its significance") with United States v.
Hughes, 389 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1968) (reference to crime's consequences for victim's family
improper); People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 722, 464 P.2d 64, 82, 83 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1970) (same);
and People v. Hyde, 1 Ill. App. 3d 831, 840-41, 275 N.E.2d 239, 245-46 (App. Ct. 1971) (same).
While the Supreme Court generally has forbidden "irrelevant" references to a victim's family,
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987), the parameters and viability of that ruling are
uncertain. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (four
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IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

"Do

JUSTICE" MANDATE

The above analysis is replete with examples in which prosecutors
must make judgment calls and difficult assessments. The existence of
broad gray areas illustrates the vagueness of the codes'* justice rule,
even when filtered through the lens of adversarial process. Some of the
problems of this vagueness already have been noted. Most significantly,
it limits the rule's effectiveness as a guide for behavior. However the
rule's mandate affects prosecutorial conduct, it does not do so on the
basis of a norm that leads to a measurably correct result. This, in turn,
undermines our expectation that the law will be applied evenly.
Perhaps more problematic is the likely psychological effect of a
vague "do justice" requirement on prosecutors. Telling government lawyers that they sometimes must act noncompetitively complicates their
self-image; it eliminates their traditional adversarial benchmark for behavior. To the extent a prosecutor may determine what constitutes justice with reference to any of her constituencies, she can rationalize most
conduct. 242 Interpreting the "do justice" requirement according to the
basic elements of adversarial process adds some substance. But the resulting mandate to do "adversarial justice" still leaves much to the
imagination.
The generality of any rule based on justice heightens the importance of enforcement and better definition through disciplinary proceedings. The notion of professionalism may include some expectation
that every lawyer will exercise good judgment to implement standards
of conduct in the public interest.2 43 But the vaguer a norm-the more it
is allowed to become subject to varying interpretations-the less valuable it becomes. Prosecutors who lack a lodestar for behavior will bow to
the instinct to minimize their responsibilities. Once the pattern of
prosecutorial behavior settles at a low ethical level, institutional and
peer pressure to obey a higher standard of conduct naturally will disappear. External pressures, such as occasional media comment, will not
influence behavior because prosecutors and their superiors can rationalJustices prepared to overrule).
242. See Steele, supra note 13, at 966 ("prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation
from the ethical standards of other lawyers"). This phenomenon of rationalization can have adverse effects on the system as a whole. Defendants and observers come to distrust the system and
question why they or their counsel should follow ethical and legal rules. See Alschuler, supra note
6, at 633 (prosecutorial misconduct may cause "public resentment of the entire legal process,"
particularly among minorities who will doubt their ability to "expect fair treatment from the
courts"). These defendants and observers, consequently, may refuse to lend respect or obedience to
the justice system. According to one commentator, "[t]he devaluation of the prosecutor's credibility among those who engage in or witness crime and their attorneys can only weaken the effectiveness of the prosecutor and encourage many to flout the law." Adlerstein, supra note 11, at 758.

243. See generally Simon, supra note 8.
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ize particular conduct and claim disagreement over the extent of the
ethical requirements.
These considerations highlight three related reasons why even a
well-interpreted, reinforced "do justice" rule may fall short of its goals.
First, a practical concern: the rule seems largely unenforceable. Second,
a behavioral concern: absent active enforcement, prosecutors have little
incentive to fulfill its requirements."" Finally, a theoretical concern:
asking prosecutors simultaneously to advocate within a process and assure that the process is fair is inherently contradictory-and perhaps
hopeless. Each of these are discussed in detail below.
If these concerns are borne out in practice, they undermine the
drafters' assumption that a broad mandate can be effective in compelling prosecutors to seek trial justice. Any "justice" formulation of
prosecutorial ethics at best provides limited guidance. A directive to
"do adversarial justice" improves upon bare justice terminology, but it
still incorporates multiple ideals. How satisfied one can be with such a
flexible standard depends on one's tolerance for leaving questions of appropriate conduct to the intuition and discretion of prosecutors themselves. To the extent that drafters expect the codes' terms to direct
prosecutorial behavior, this Article's adversarial approach may prove
far more useful in drafting new particularized standards than as a
mechanism that itself defines conduct which prosecutors must pursue.
A.

Problems of Enforcing a Generalized Call to Justice

Let us assume that code drafters, prosecutors, courts, and disciplinary bodies accept adversarial justice as an accurate interpretation of
the codes' mandate. In the few situations in which a prosecutor's duty
to restore adversarial imbalance is clear, disciplinary bodies might enforce the "do justice" requirement. However, in those cases in which
the prosecutor must exercise judgment or employ common sense, the
authorities will hesitate to penalize her failure to choose correctly.
Every time a prosecutor considers "justice" in the trial context, the
most concrete guidepost she can look to is the adversarial premises.
These have far more meat than the simple term "justice," but each premise is subject to interpretation. Broad theoretical concepts like equal
adversariness, equal resources, neutral and passive tribunals, and evidence in the record, though substantive, contain significant flexibility.
Accordingly, we have seen that the questions they engender are themselves fuzzy: When is an adversary performing outside the wide range of
244. Cf. Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy (Book Review), 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 116, 146 (1990) (noting that "ethical requirements that are widely disobeyed are likely to
do more harm than good").
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acceptable competence? What constitutes equal access to information
or resources? Has a trial judge gone too far in restricting the opponent's
evidentiary presentation? Is an argument based on irrelevant emotions
or on facts in the record?
Interpretation of the standard is further complicated because the
codes use "justice" not only as the trigger for determining when prosecutors should take unusual action, but also as the reference point for
determining the type of action that is required. The concrete fact patterns discussed in this Article show that numerous options always will
be available-ranging from leaving the matter to the opponent, trial
judge, or appellate court to performing the role of defense counsel. Adversarial considerations sometimes suggest the appropriate remedy. But
predicting the level of prosecutorial intervention that will restore adversarial balance is necessarily an inexact science. Discipliners necessarily
will resist second-guessing prosecutors' judgments.
A similar impediment to enforcement of the "do justice" standard
is its occasional focus on the prosecutor's state of mind. For example, a
prosecutor may be justified in mentioning inadmissible evidence in an
opening statement if she truly believes the evidence will be allowed and
that introducing it early is important. In contrast, if the prosecutor's
purpose is to focus jurors' attention on potentially inadmissible facts,
she undermines adversarial justice.245 Although disciplinary bodies are
capable of considering the motivation of alleged code offenders, they
prefer to enforce rules that are objective in nature.246
Resource considerations also limit the likelihood of vigorous enforcement. To date, discipliners have treated "do justice" provisions as
hortatory. No prosecutor has ever been sanctioned for failing to do justice at trial.2 47 That reality reflects, in part, the recognition that prosecutors are public servants. In trying to maintain the bar's
professionalism, discipliners naturally prefer to focus their limited resources on attorney misconduct driven by personal self-interest or
greed.
Moreover, investigating prosecutorial misconduct probably would
consume more resources than cases of ethical violations by private lawyers. Disciplinary committees typically rely on client complaints to
245. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. Similarly, a prosecutor's motives may
determine the propriety of her selection of or appeals to potentially biased jurors. See supra note
235 and accompanying text.
246. Cf. In re Warhaftig, 106 N.J. 529, 533, 524 A.2d 398, 401 (1987) ("lawyer's subjective
intent. . . is irrelevant to the determination of the appropriate discipline in a misappropriation
case"').

247.

At least, this Author has found no reported opinions revealing discipline. See authorities

cited supra note 14.
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bring misconduct to their attention.' 4 8 Because prosecutors have no clients, the bar's only recourse to enforce the "do justice" rule is to institute its own investigations, based on news reports or occasional referrals

by judges or opposing counsel. 249 Even if the bar is in principle willing
to commit time and effort to investigation, determining where to look
may be difficult. A prosecutor's ethical breach rarely will appear clearly
on the trial record.2 50 Often it will be known only to the prosecutor
herself. 51
Enforcing the "do justice" mandate would force disciplinary com-

mittees to confront not only fiscal limitations but also limitations on
their own authority. Prosecutors who appear in local courts or by virtue
of their membership in a state bar seem subject to that state's ethical
rules. Federal prosecutors, however, have taken the position that they
are immune on preemption grounds. 52 Some state prosecutors even
have asserted that intrastate enforcement would undermine separation
of powers. 5 s To avoid spending resources on litigating such jurisdictional disputes, disciplinary authorities may forego implementing the
codes against one or the other prosecution corps.
In short, the future prospects for vigorous enforcement of the
248. Defendants themselves offer a poor source of information because they virtually always
will perceive prosecutors to have acted improperly in pursuing and convicting them. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 13.10.2, at 761 ("disciplinary agencies are probably reluctant to pursue complaints against prosecutors that may be motivated by resentment at convictions").
249. Such referrals, of course, are rare throughout the realm of ethical violations. To the
extent a standard of conduct is vague, such as "do justice," lawyers and judges are likely to be
particularly hesitant to report misconduct. Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 42, at 689 (noting the failure
of courts to refer instances of misconduct to the bar and urging requirement that courts do so);
Steele, supra note 13, at 980 (finding "[o]nly one reported case . . . in which defense counsel
reported a prosecutor to a bar grievance committee").
250. Defendants' appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel routinely fail because the
trial record does not clearly reflect the ineffectiveness. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying
text. To establish a breach of prosecutorial ethics, it often will be necessary to determine not only
the nature of defense counsel's performance-including knowledge and strategy-but that of the
prosecutor as well.
251. In cases of unequal adversariness, for example, the trial judge may not be aware of
defense counsel's omissions. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. Similarly, in questions involving access to information by the defense, the prosecutor's ethical obligation may arise
specifically because only the prosecutor knows the information. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text. A prosecutor's practice of selecting jurors on the basis of racial or other bias is unlikely to be apparent from his conduct in a single case.
252. The United States Department of Justice has taken the position that state discipline
does not apply to federal attorneys if it conflicts "with the attorneys' federal responsibilities." R.
Thornburgh, Memorandum on Communication with Persons Represented By Counsel 3 (June 8,
1989); see also Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 402 (1963) (state rules regarding the practice of law
are preempted by federal patent office's rules regulating persons who may appear before it).
253. See J. DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 77-78 (discussing the possibility that bar disciplinary
committees may lack jurisdiction to sanction state prosecutors); Steele, supra note 13, at 967-69

(same).
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prosecutorial duty are dim. Even this Article's proposed clarification of
the codes is unlikely to have a dramatic effect. Reading adversarial
principles into the rule might facilitate discipline of clear violators, such
as the prosecutor who fails to disclose police investigatory misconduct.2 54 Except at the fringes, however, few "trial justice" situations are
obvious or compelling enough to shift the bar's traditional disciplinary
focus.
B.

Justice As an Inadequate Guide for Self-Restraint

The generality of the "do justice" mandate and the unlikelihood of
enforcement alone do not undermine its significance. After all, the
codes are a call to professionalism on the part of lawyers. Many ethical
'255
provisions are hortatory: lawyers must, for example, act with "zeal,
be "loyal, 25 6 consult regularly with clients,25 7 and avoid "fraud" upon
the court.255 In reality, few rules are enforced vigorously. Their primary
value lies in the guidance they provide, the continuing legal and ethical
education they provoke, and their effect in encouraging lawyers to restrain their own conduct. Unethical lawyers always will ignore the codes
when the codes conflict with their self-interest; scrupulous attorneys
will try to follow the codes' commands.2 59
Two psychological factors limit the effectiveness of "do justice"
provisions as instruments of prosecutorial self-restraint. First, the codes
seem to send prosecutors conflicting mandates: be zealous advocates,
but temper your zeal. The adversarial interpretation of justice reconciles the mandates as a theoretical matter. Yet it asks prosecutors to
walk a fine line. It requires prosecutors to be conscious at all times of a
dual, somewhat schizophrenic role.
Second, the codes expect prosecutors to accomplish the balance of
roles in the setting least conducive to reflective thought. Nowhere do
lawyers' competitive juices flow more freely than at trial. Winning is at
a premium. Asking prosecutors to step calmly out of an advocacy pos254. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. This assumes, of course, that the prosecutor's violation somehow comes to light.
255. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.3 comment; CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-1.
256. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7 comment; CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1.
257. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2(a).
258. Id. Rule 3.3(a); CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(B).
259. Case histories suggest that many prosecutors regard the hortatory command to "do justice" seriously, often taking drastic steps to protect defendants' rights. See, e.g., Gross, Loss of
Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 423 (1987) (discussing prosecutorial actions to avoid convictions based on misidentifications); Kaplan, The
ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 178-81 (1965) (discussing practices
of author's office). The problem lies in the fact that, absent a clear definition of justice, prosecutors
who emphasize a defendant's rights over the victim's can be seen to be miscarrying justice.
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ture, therefore, may be unrealistic. As a psychological matter, prosecutors are apt to make choices within the codes' parameters that least
reduce the chance of conviction.
Practical and institutional incentives reinforce this natural tendency. Government lawyers compete with each other for promotion and
recognition. Prosecutors who restrain themselves may convict at a lower
rate and thus appear less competent to their superiors. An ethical prosecutor's productivity may decline as well. Some of the actions necessary
for "doing justice" may delay triaIs. Reporting ineffective defense counsel will provoke hearings. Providing previously undisclosed information
will lead to defense motions. Because the ethical prosecutor consequently will process fewer cases, she may damage her reputation with a
production-oriented bench. To the extent her actions highlight poor
performance by defense counsel, her relationship with the bar also may
deteriorate. 6 0
To expect prosecutors themselves to interpret even "adversarial
justice" broadly therefore may be unrealistic. In other contexts, the
threat of sanctions is probably what keeps lawyers from understating
ethical directives that contradict their selfish interests.2 61 Here, because
sanctions are virtually unimaginable, the self-established norm of adversarial justice is likely to settle at a low level. Most of the prosecutor's
natural incentives point toward rationalizing defense performance as
within the acceptable range, not deeming prosecutorial access to information and forensic services as unique, and leaving procedural fairness
concerns to appellate review.26 2
Despite this analysis, the clarification of justice proposed by this
Article probably would have some effect on prosecutorial conduct. Indeed, the substance that the clarification adds to the codes might
prompt enough enforcement to make prosecutors take heed. Moreover,
it might change how prosecutors' peers and observers of the criminal
260. Richard Danzig has discussed the problem of attempting to control ethical practices
through open-ended rules. He concludes that "insofar as the approach is workable, it tends to
confine the impact of the law to a reaffirmation of the predominant morals of the marketplace."
Danzig, supra note 4, at 629.
261. Disciplinary committees tend to focus their resources on enforcing rules that lawyers
wish to violate for selfish reasons. Most reported decisions deal with breaches of fiduciary duty,
misuse of client funds, conflicts of interest, and lawyer fraud.
262. See Gershman, supra note, 13, at 226 ("When misconduct is insulated from attack, there
is no incentive to discontinue the practice"). One institutional incentive for prosecutors not to
underestimate the "do justice" obligation may be their desire to be trusted and respected by
judges and others in the legal community. However, because different judges and lawyers interpret
the abstract notion of justice in varying ways, including "convict the guilty at all cost," it is unclear
in which direction this incentive pushes prosecutors. Arguably, defining the meaning of "doing
justice" would establish a consensus and would promote greater respect for justice-oriented
prosecutors.
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justice system perceive ethical behavior. Once prosecuting offices understand that justice has an identifiable meaning, they are likely to incorporate appropriate norms for prosecutorial conduct in training
programs and in internal office manuals."' They also may see the need
for institutional reforms that reward, rather than punish, activities that
promote justice.2 64 This change in orientation by supervisors and other
staff members, in turn, could create pressure toward voluntary improvements in conduct. Referring to adversarial principles helps establish
and clarify a baseline and, consequently, would encourage among all
265
prosecutors the sense that "justice" should be taken seriously.
At a minimum, the adversarial justice framework should rationalize
the focus of prosecutors who would otherwise view the codes' mandate
in radically different ways. The framework helps prosecutors and disciplinary bodies in identifying which situations constitute a problem of
justice within the codes' meaning and which situations do not. It defines relevant considerations and draws lines that help conflicted prosecutors resolve their dilemmas. Unethical and unprofessional

government lawyers will ignore those lines, but only as unethical and
unprofessional private lawyers always have circumvented the codes.
C.

Some Lessons for Rulemakers

By subjecting prosecutors to the professional codes, the bar imposes on them the obligation to be zealous. Within the adversary system, that turns prosecutors loose as advocates. It tells them to "play
the game hard," subject only to rules that the codes set to assure a fair
game.
263. In 1980 the United States Department of Justice issued a "comprehensive listing of
policies and practices to be followed by all [federal] prosecutors." Comment, Justice Department's
Guidelines of Little Value to State and Local Prosecutors,72 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 958
(1981). Interestingly, these guidelines focused almost exclusively on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in charging defendants, entering into plea and nonprosecution agreements, and sentencing. Id. at 967-71. To the extent that this Article alerts offices to the ethical dilemmas individual
prosecutors face at trial, it may encourage them to offer their staffs more guidance.
264. Thus, for example, a prosecuting office might adjust its emphasis on convictions in evaluating individual prosecutors for promotions and other benefits. To the extent a prosecutor's conviction rate is all that counts, the institutional incentives point toward minimizing the
responsibility to "do justice." Cf. Rhode, Ethical Perspectivesin Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. R.v.
589, 624-25, 639-43 (1985) (discussing ways the structure of corporate law firms influence and fragment lawyers' views of appropriate moral responsibility).
265. It is possible that even minimal clarification of the justice provision's meaning will encourage actors other than prosecutors to take steps to foster justice. For example, if judges believe
prosecutors will report inadequate defense counsel in the middle of trials-thus delaying verdicts
or even causing mistrials-judges may take more care initially to appoint competent attorneys.
Similarly, defense counsel awareness of the prosecutorial obligation to preserve a neutral tribunal
may prompt counsel to enlist prosecutorial assistance when they otherwise might ignore the threat
to justice.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:45

The "do justice" rule is not simply another provision requiring or
forbidding these lawyers to act in a particular way, when a particular
problem arises. The rule delegates an oversight function to them. But
the bare language of the rule is misleading. On a superficial reading, it
seems to tell prosecutors to "play the game hard, but if the result will
not be right, change the rules and fix the game."
Interpreting the codes' intent with reference to the essential elements of the adversary system clarifies the real meaning of the ethical
directive and helps structure a prosecutor's supplemental role. It limits
their umpiring function to ensuring that the game's preset rules are followed. Acting as player and referee, though, is still an inherently contradictory role. The expectation that prosecutors can fulfill both roles
without better instruction may be misguided.
As a blueprint for writing rules, however, the concept of "adversarial justice" is clearly more valuable. It establishes three root principles: (1) ordinarily, we want prosecutors to advocate aggressively; (2) we
should depart from the adversarial model when the process is not working as envisioned; and (3) prosecutors are in a unique position to notice
and control certain situations in-which the process has broken down.
These principles give code drafters and intra-office rulemakers a basis
for distinguishing when prosecutors should act as advocates and when
they should not.2 66
The adversarial justice framework also would help code drafters
prescribe prosecutorial responses to breakdowns in the adversary system. It leads drafters to consider specifically how the adversarial premises may fail, and thereby forces them to select among the available
options for restoring adversarial balance. Those are choices that informed rulemakers should make, not prosecutors in the heat of battle.
Greater specificity in the rules for ethical prosecutorial behavior
would promote consistent conduct throughout the prosecution corps.
Government lawyers may resist or manipulate general commands like
"do justice" or "assure adversarial balance." But most will obey direct
requirements, such as a provision requiring them to inform a trial judge
2 67
of defense counsel's failure to file a nonfrivolous, no-lose motion.
Clear rules are enforceable. Violations are easily deterred.
266. One should not underestimate the importance of a governing framework. In attempting
to promulgate rules for prosecutorial conduct in the early 1970s, an ABA committee drafted a
hefty set of specific standards that lacked a theme. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 131, Standards 3-1.1 to 3-6.2. Each provision reflected the personal, ad hoc reactions of the drafters on how
prosecutors should act in particular settings. Naturally, when situations are considered on an individual basis, reasonable people will differ on appropriate prosecutorial conduct. The result was a
set of compromised, helter-skelter rules; the standards lack coherence and underlying logic. The
ABA declined to incorporate them in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
267. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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Focusing expressly on adversarial justice would have another, surprising benefit for rulemakers. It would enable them to decide when to
depart from the overarching adversarial model in order to implement
safeguards against inaccurate verdicts." 8 Nothing prevents society,
through code drafters, from adopting a new conception of prosecutors-one in which prosecutors toss off the traditional advocate's mantle.26 9 In analyzing trial conduct with reference to adversarial justice,
drafters may encounter situations in which they are not satisfied with
trial results even though they are adversarially "appropriate" or
"valid." Having identified these situations, the drafters can decide
whether and when they are prepared to limit prosecutorial advocacy
solely for the protection of innocent defendants' rights.
Consider the question of whether prosecutors may emphasize the
seriousness of a crime in summation. Arguably, a crime's gravity is irrelevant. The jury must decide only whether this defendant committed
the crime. Nevertheless, although courts sometimes limit prosecutors'
emphasis, they never prevent prosecutors from arguing heinousness altogether. Presumably, courts grant prosecutors this latitude in order to
counteract defendants' ability to persuade jurors that the crime is excusable or does not warrant punishment.
Adversarial equality notions suggest that the prosecutor may argue
heinousness aggressively as long as the argument is based on facts in
the record and the court allows it.27 0 Yet code drafters justifiably may
fear that overemphasizing heinousness distracts jurors from the truly
relevant issues. In other words, a jury may become so appalled by a
crime that it does not consider fairly whether the defendant committed
it. Telling prosecutors to "do adversarial justice" does not address the
problem.
Formulating rules according to the adversarial justice analysis thus
forces drafters to confront and resolve their qualms. They have the authority to adopt ethical provisions that are more protective of defendants' interests than the law of procedure or the due process decisions.
The options range from extreme rules (e.g., "prosecutors may never argue the heinousness of an offense") to provisions that tolerate emotional arguments on a case-by-case basis (e.g., "prosecutors may not
refer to heinousness except when necessary to counteract a defendant's
suggestion that the crime is not serious"). In the alternative, code drafters have some prerogative to reduce the prosecutor's obligations to the
268. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
269. See generally Luban, supra note 26 (criticizing the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role and making a case for lawyers as "moral activists"); Simon, supra note 8 (calling upon
lawyers to exercise discretionary moral judgement in lawyering).
270. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text.
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adversary system in order to enhance competitiveness and reduce the
likelihood that guilty defendants will go free. An arguably reasonable
rule, for example, could permit prosecutors to raise false inferences in
argument when necessary to counteract similar conduct by the defense.
Tailoring the rule to the concerns that prompt it forces the drafters to
analyze the costs and benefits of restricting or enlarging the scope of
prosecutorial argument.YM Leaving the matter to prosecutors' unfettered sense of justice does not. 2
Specific rules also would underscore the fundamental limitations of
ethical codes. As previously discussed, justice depends on competent
representation of defendants and rough equality of resources. 7 3 Generalized "do justice" provisions create the impression that prosecutors
have power to equalize the defense. The truth is that in our criminal
justice system the adversary process often does not work.274 By writing
271. Pursuing this analysis forces drafters to compare due process and sixth amendment
standards and to evaluate whether these standards sufficiently assure trial justice. The very concept of requiring prosecutors to do justice as an ethical matter suggests that the drafters sometimes expect prosecutors to exceed minimal constitutional requirements. Thus, for example, code
drafters may restrict prosecutorial argument in a way that due process does not. Similarly, in
enforcing equal adversariness, drafters may make prosecutors provide information that defendants
do not request or that state and constitutional law do not require to be disclosed.
272. The witness examination scenarios discussed infra at notes 207-18 and accompanying
text present another context in which code draffers might wish to depart from the adversarial
model. The adversarial model suggests that prosecutors need not refrain from attacking truthful
defense witnesses or presenting prosecution witnesses whose testimony they doubt. After reflecting
upon that result, code drafters might well desire additional protections for truthful defense witnesses or special hurdles for questionable prosecution witnesses on the theory that the adversary
system's built-in safeguards are inadequate. See Simon, supra note 8, at 1102-03 (noting that effective lawyering can undermine even reliable fact-finding procedures). Alternatively, code drafters
might adopt a special rule for prosecutorial witness examinations because of a desire to afford
prophylactic protections for innocent defendants, even at the risk of losing otherwise valid convictions. My point is simply that restrictions on prosecutorial witness examination do not flow from
the "justice" envisioned by the prevailing codes. If prosecutors restrain themselves-and thereby
lose some of their effectiveness-they should do so because lawmakers or code drafters have analyzed the costs and benefits of a departure from adversariness and have concluded that the departure is appropriate.
273. See supra notes 73-75, 93-175 and accompanying text.
274. Critiquing the adversary system as a whole is beyond this Article's scope. However, generalizing about the operation of adversarial premises in different litigation contexts provides insights into the codes' decision to handicap prosecutorial advocacy. In standard commercial
litigation, one can expect adversaries to be roughly equivalent in competence and resources. Commercial litigators often represent both plaintiffs and defendants; in a given case, without knowing
the parties, one usually could not predict which side would have the resource advantage.
In tort litigation, the bar begins to divide. In earlier years, at least, personal injury lawyers
were poor and often were perceived as outclassed. However, with the development of an organized
(and sometimes well-financed) plaintiffs bar, the dichotomy of counsel competence and resources
has broken down somewhat. One therefore might assume, or at least hope, that the principles of
equal adversariness and resources hold.
No one can argue seriously that these conclusions apply in routine criminal litigation. The
appointed criminal bar tends to consist of lawyers who cannot find other work. The material re-
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limited rules, tailored only to the extreme failures that require
prosecutorial reaction, drafters will highlight how rarely prosecutorial
good faith can supply a solution. This revelation may help teach legislators and taxpayers an important lesson: the answer to poor defense representation does not lie in ethical rules; it lies in the commitment of
resources to provide better counsel and to repair other system-wide
2 75

flaws.

V.

CONCLUSION

The generalized approach to prosecutorial ethics promises much
and delivers little. Ethical standards by their nature are ideals. But the
code drafters' use of the amorphous justice concept abdicates their responsibility to write meaningful rules. The drafters seem to take a
stand on the prosecutorial role, but in practice fail to set standards affecting behavior. The major impact of "do justice" provisions is to permit the drafters to avoid looking seriously at the conduct of criminal
trials. Code drafters could adopt a view of the prosecuting attorney's
role that differs from the traditional conception of prosecutor as advocate. But such a radical restructuring of the role would have to be explicit and detailed. One cannot reasonably attribute that purpose to the
terse mandate that prosecutors "do justice."
This Article has accepted as a given the adversary orientation of
the codes and interpreted their justice provisions in the most substantive and meaningful way possible. Throughout the course of a prosecution, the prosecutor must have a good faith belief in the defendant's
guilt. At the trial stage the prosecutor has additional obligations, but
these are limited to assuring that the essential premises of the adversary system hold true. This adversarial conception of "justice" is instructive, for it confirms the prosecuting attorney's identity. A
prosecutor may be zealous. She may advocate, almost to the limits of
her talents. Once the charging and plea bargaining stages are complete,
she usually may act like any trial lawyer acts.
The adversarial justice interpretation helps prosecutors understand
when the codes oblige them to step out of role and suggests ways prosecutors can react. In this respect, however, the approach leaves much to
sources that courts allocate to indigent defendants pale in comparison to the government resources. That code drafters perceive a need to somehow equalize the balance thus is not surprising.
Indeed, the most surprising element may be that society has opted for an adversarial process in
criminal trials at all.
275. Similarly, adversarial justice principles only rarely will require prosecutors to provide
the defense with information and forensic assistance. Identifying this limited impact through specific ethical rules again highlights the need for changes in discovery procedures if "equal resources"
is society's true goal.

114

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:45

personal judgment. As a guide for prosecutorial conduct, it is only
that-a general guide.
Thus, the Article's key message is for code drafters and other
rulemakers. The analysis of the existing "do justice" provisions illustrates the need for rules or presumptions that help delineate ethical
prosecutorial behavior. Amazingly, no one has ever provided a methodology for drafting unified standards. The adversarial framework
presented here offers a blueprint for writing specific provisions in ways
that make sense.

